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ABSTRACT
This dissertation encompasses three different topics in applied microeconomics with the com-
mon thread of understanding the impact of public policy on economic behavior, choice, and wel-
fare. By employing causal inference methods, I identify the intended and unintended effects of
immigration policies on crime rates and labor market preferences. By applying a nonparametric
identification technique, I evaluate the measurement error in reported subjective well-being, an
alternative criterion gaining the attention of more researchers to evaluate policy interventions.
In the first essay, I study the effect of Alabama’s HB56 immigration law on crime. Alabama HB
56 passed in 2011, is considered to be the strictest anti-illegal immigration bill in the United States.
By using the synthetic control method to create a counter-factual Alabama, this chapter provides
suggestive evidence of heterogeneous causal effects of Alabama HB 56 on crime. Compared to the
synthetic group, the rate of violent crime increased as a response to Alabama HB 56, while there
was no significant change in property crime rate after the law was implemented. A placebo test is
performed to demonstrate the robustness of the results.
In the second essay, I investigate the impact of the H-1B cap exemption on Ph.D. labor markets.
The American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 (AC 21) eliminated the H-
1B cap for foreign employees of academic, non-profit and government research organizations. This
act potentially affects the job preferences of newly graduated foreign Ph.D students. Choosing a
career in an uncapped H-1B qualified entity makes the foreign-born Ph.D. graduates to circumvent
the risk of facing the fiercely competitive H-1B application process and possibly avoiding potential
losses due to a visa rejection. I use data from the Census of Ph.D. graduates to examine the policy
impact on academic and industry labor markets in the United States. The results show that Ph.D.
graduates with temporary visas are 5% more likely to pursue a job in academia, and 3-4% less
likely to choose a job in industry. Placebo and falsification tests on post-doctoral participation
further exclude other external changes that could possibly affect the job market.
As a measure of welfare, the growth of subjective well-being (SWB) is among the most criti-
ii
cal aims in human society. However, self-reported well-being is potentially subject to significant
misclassification errors. In the final essay, I employ a recently developed method from the mea-
surement error literature to correct measures of reported happiness in 80 countries. I find that
misclassification errors are correlated with prevalent religious beliefs and countries’ economic de-
velopment stages, along with other individual characteristics. By utilizing the corrected SWB, I
further reexamine the Easterlin paradox and modified-Easterlin hypothesis. The findings indicate
that although reported SWB is not associated with GDP per capita, the corrected measure of SWB
is. I find no evidence for a happiness satiation point as defined in previous studies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Evaluation of public economic policies has historical roots in social and political philosophy.
From Aristotle’s Politics to John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty and Utilitarianism, ancient philosophers
developed ideas on the government’s role in improving society and whether a government should
interfere with individual’s decision-making process. In modern society, difficulties in achieving
social reconciliation on matters of public concern are also mainly due to the competing philosoph-
ical principles held by social groups. The problems can be of economic, social and political nature.
Policy instruments serve to mitigate differences among social classes on these issues.
As a continuous process, policy making generates several feedback loops. Evaluating the eco-
nomic and social impact of policy intervention plays a critical role in guaranteeing the implemen-
tation of goals set by program designers and policy makers. In this sense, the concept of program
evaluation not only refers to the results of policy interventions, but more broadly to the efficiency
and efficacy of the governmental decision-making process.
While the ultimate goal of policy interventions is to improve social well-being, the criterion
for improvement has been extended from objective to subjective measures in economic studies.
With limited emphasis on subjective measures, in the past policy makers neglected the possibility
that policy interventions, e.g. welfare programs, could negatively affect an individual’s subjective
well-being (SWB).1 As a result, many individuals eligible for a program refuse to participate when
only objective indicators are considered to define well-being improvement.2
This doctoral research is an attempt to shed light on two aspects of public policy analysis.
Using causal inference techniques, the first two studies focus on identifying the socio-economic
impacts of immigration laws of two types: one is associated with undocumented immigrants, while
the other one is linked to foreign-born high-skilled labor market participants. In the third study,
with a newly developed eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition technique, I identify the prevalent
1Recipients may derive disutility from feelings of lack of self-respect and negative self-characterizations of partic-
ipating in a welfare program (Horan and Austin, 1974).
2This phenomenon, introduced by Moffitt (1983) in his seminal paper, is known as “Welfare Stigma”.
1
measurement errors in self-reported subjective well-being, one critical issue when using SWB as
an indication of welfare improvement in policy evaluation.
Viewed as one focus of public concern, immigration is at the center of political debate. Identi-
fying the intended and unintended impacts of immigration policies on different aspects of society
has significant repercussions. In the first essay, I identify an anti-illegal immigrant bill’s initial ef-
fect on crime rate. In 2011, Alabama enacted the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen
Protection Act (Alabama HB 56), which was considered the nation’s strictest anti-illegal immi-
gration bill (Fausset, 2011). The bill imposes extreme restrictions on undocumented immigrants
in Alabama and set limits on every aspect of their lives, including enrollment in schools and job
market participation. Our study is motivated by a recent interest in the literature to evaluate anti-
illegal immigrant laws (Bohn et al., 2014; Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman, 2017), and its impact on
crime rate (Bell et al., 2013). To evaluate the impact of Alabama HB 56 on crime this paper uses
the synthetic control approach, which was first employed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). I
create a counter-factual synthetic Alabama based on crime reports, economic indicators, and de-
mographic characteristic during the period 1998-2014. Variables used in constructing the synthetic
Alabama are chosen following the literature on crime rate (Blau and Blau, 1982; Bailey, 1984; Fa-
jnzylber et al., 2002). Particularly, to proxy the risk of being arrested and punished, I use police
presence and capital sentence legality accessed from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I used the
admission cases of primary substance use of marijuana and alcohol, accessed from the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, as a proxy for illicit drug use. Gallup’s polling
data for practicing religion and church attendance are employed to account for cultural character-
istics. State level economic indicators such as Gini index and unemployment status are obtained
in the American Community Survey and Current Population Survey. Estimation results provide
suggestive evidence of heterogeneous causal effects of Alabama HB 56 on crime. Compared with
the synthetic counterpart, Alabama HB 56 contributed to an increase in violent crime rates, while
there was no significant change in property crime rates after the act. The results can be linked to
the seminal work of Gary Becker (Becker, 1968), who modeled criminal behavior from a rational
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decision analysis based on the benefits and opportunity costs of crime. In general, unemployment
status decreases the opportunity cost of criminal behavior. Fleisher (1966) and Ehrlich (1973)
document a significant causal effect of unemployment on criminal activities in the US. Since the
Alabama HB restricts undocumented immigrants from taking job positions, it is expected to in-
crease criminal activities. Another possible mechanism is associated to the growing literature on
expressive value of law, which suggests the act of enacting a particular law serves the function of
shaping norms or prescribed attitude towards behavior (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017). The adoption
of an anti-immigration law will send out a signal of increased tolerance to discrimination behav-
ior against undocumented workers, which can also potentially generate tensions or conflicts that
may result in violent crimes against undocumented immigrants. Whether the increase in violent
crimes is committed by undocumented immigrants or against them, and through which underlying
mechanism merit further investigation using richer data.
In the second essay, I leverage the H-1B policy shock generated by the AC 21 as an exogenous
variation and examine the subsequent changes in foreign Ph.D graduates’ job market preferences.
The American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act (AC 21) was signed into law in Oc-
tober, 2000 (U.S. Congress, 2000). It eliminates the cap on the number of H-1B visas granted for
applicants in universities, non-profit and government research institutions. As a result, choosing
a career in an uncapped H-1B qualified entity means to circumvent the risk of facing the fiercely
competitive H-1B application process and possibly avoiding potential losses due to a visa rejection.
Accordingly, AC 21 would impose a direct effect on foreign-born Ph.D. graduates’ job preference
in academia, while having an indirect (or second degree) effect on the job preference in indus-
try. Our study is motivated by a profound linkage between the H-1B program and high-skilled
labor markets in the United States. One key issue surrounding the immigration debate is whether
high-skilled immigrants have a complementary or displacing effect on domestic workers. Most
immigrant scientists and engineers started their careers in the United States via this visa program
and they are now making substantial contributions to the economy and advancing technological de-
velopment (Peri, 2007; Anderson and Platzer, 2006; Wadhwa et al., 2007). In this sense, a relaxed
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visa policy for high-skilled immigrants allows experts from a wide range of fields to stay in the US
labor market after completing their studies, producing benefits over the long run. Yet, the debate
about the short-run effects of the H-1B visa program is still unsettled. A crowding-out influence
from the influx of high-skilled immigrants on domestic workers is supported by the literature (Bor-
jas, 2005; Islam, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Borjas and Doran, 2012). A crucial challenge
for detecting this effect relies on overcoming the endogeneity of the behavior of immigrants in the
job market. An evaluation of how immigration policy changes influence job market preferences of
high-skilled immigrants paves the way to accurately identify the impact of foreign workers on do-
mestic workers. To quantitatively identify the treatment effect on job market choices, we establish
our estimation model using individual level variation in visa status and graduation time, before and
after the policy shock. Due to idiosyncratic features of each doctorate academic field, our baseline
specification includes both major and year fixed effects. In order to allow for different disciplines
to have distinct trajectories over time, we estimate models that incorporate major-specific linear
trends. Specifications extending to incorporate field-by-year fixed effects to allow majors of differ-
ent fields to accommodate differential shocks are also investigated. Our Difference-in-Difference
estimates suggest a strong causal relationship between AC 21 and the job preferences of Ph.D
holders in academia and industry labor markets. We find that after the implementation of AC 21,
foreign Ph.D graduates are 5% more likely to pursue a job in academia, and 3-4% less likely to
choose an industry job compared to U.S. domestic graduates. Placebo experiments and falsifica-
tion tests exclude the possibility of other external changes around the same time period driving
these results.
In the third essay, we examine the potential misclassification errors in self-reported happiness
data and explore the characteristics of countries and demographic groups with substantial mis-
classification errors. The well-known Easterlin paradox and modified Easterlin hypothesis are
re-examined with the corrected SWB data. The pursuit of happiness has been paramount for hu-
mankind throughout history. It has evoked the attention of philosophers from Epicurus and Aris-
totle to Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Evaluating social well-being is a central topic in
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economics. A recent and growing literature argues that income and consumption are not ideal mea-
sures of welfare (see Fleurbaey (2009) for a review). Subjective well-being (SWB) can arguably
be used as a standard for measuring social welfare and progress. Recently, it is gaining attention
in economic research on policy evaluation. The most frequently used method to elicit SWB is to
directly ask people about their feelings of happiness and overall life satisfaction (e.g., Frey and
Stutzer, 2000, 2002, 2010; Diener, 2000). However, compared to objective indicators of social
welfare, SWB is subject to substantial misreporting or measurement errors (e.g., Hagedorn, 1996;
OECD, 2013; Diener et al., 2013; Sheridan et al., 2015; Chetty, 2015). Although the ample evi-
dence of measurement errors is documented in self-reported happiness, this issue has been mostly
ignored by empirical practitioners. To address this concern, we apply a novel closed-form identifi-
cation and estimation method first proposed by Hu (2008) and developed in Feng and Hu (2013).
In general, the methodology employs an eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition technique to es-
tablish a closed-form identification for the misclassification matrix of SWB, which is constructed
a priori using the conditional distribution of reported happiness. By pre-multiplying the inverse
of the identified misclassification matrix by the unconditional distribution of reported SWB, the
true latent SWB distribution is directly estimated. The identification strategy in our article is im-
plemented closely in the spirit of Feng and Hu (2013). For computation time reasons, we select
80 countries based on geographical diversity and consistency of survey data across periods in the
Integrated European/World Value Survey (EVS/WVS). We use reported “feeling of happiness”
in EVS/WVS as the direct measurement of SWB, while “life satisfaction” (LS) and “freedom of
choice and control in life” (FCC) serve as two repeated measures of SWB. Under relatively weak
assumptions, we are able to obtain the latent SWB probability distributions by country and demo-
graphic groups. Another motivation of our study is related to the well-known “Easterlin paradox”
(Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). The Easterlin paradox posits that al-
though there is a positive correlation between individual income and measures of SWB, aggregate
happiness is not significantly associated with GDP per capita. Meanwhile, a modified version of
the Easterlin’s hypothesis has also been proposed. It argues that the correlation between income
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and SWB only exists for individuals with income below a certain threshold, beyond which income
is no longer related to happiness (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Clark et al., 2008; Di Tella and MacCul-
loch, 2008; Di Tella et al., 2010). Our analysis produces the following major findings. We find
that self-reported happiness elicited from survey questions has substantial misclassification errors.
Religious belief and the development stage of a country play critical roles in determining the mag-
nitude of misclassification errors in reported SWB. We revisit the Easterlin paradox and find that
based on a country level analysis there is no evidence supporting neither the original hypothesis
nor the modified version of the Easterlin’s paradox when using the corrected measure of happi-
ness, although the reported (uncorrected) SWB provides support to the original Easterlin paradox.
These findings imply that, to use SWB measures in evaluating economic development and welfare,
they have to be corrected for measurement errors.
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2. UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF THE ALABAMA HB 56 IMMIGRATION LAW ON
CRIME: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS*
2.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, illegal immigration has received considerable attention from state gov-
ernments. In 2007, Arizona passed the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), which was followed 
in 2010 by SB 1070; the harshest U.S. act against undocumented immigrants at the time. One year 
later Alabama enacted the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (Al-
abama HB 56), which is now considered the nation’s strictest anti-illegal immigration bill (Fausset, 
2011). Both legislative acts were enacted to restrict the enrollment of undocumented immigrants 
in schooling and in the job market. The consequences of these anti-illegal immigration acts have 
received much attention from governments and researchers. Despite the growing interest in the re-
lationship between illegal immigration and crime environment, the evaluation of the causal effect 
of those policies is subject to debate. While evidence of positive relationship between immigration 
and crime has been found in some recent studies, such as Spenkuch (2013), a major vast literature 
provides suggestive evidence that immigrant legalization has contributed to the decline of crime 
(Baker, 2015; Mastrobuoni and Pinotti, 2015; Pinotti, 2017). Meanwhile, some previous studies 
suggest that immigration has no effect on crime (Butcher and Piehl, 1998; Chalfin, 2013).
This paper evaluates the impact of Alabama HB 56 on crime using the synthetic control ap-
proach, which was first employed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) to estimate the consequences 
of the conflict in B asque, S pain. They constructed a  synthetic ‘Basque’ using a  weighted aver-
age of other provinces in Spain according to similarities in economic and demographic indicators. 
Following their approach, we create a counterfactual synthetic Alabama based on crime reports, 
economic indicators, and demographic characteristic during the period 1998-2014. The results 
provide suggestive evidence of heterogeneous causal effects of Alabama HB 56 on crime. Com-
∗This chapter is reprinted from Economics Letters, 147, Zhang, Yinjunjie, Marco A. Palma, and Zhicheng Phil Xu, 
“Unintended effects of the Alabama HB 56 immigration law on crime: A preliminary analysis.”, 68-71, Copyright 
(2016), with permission from Elsevier.
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pared with the synthetic counterpart, Alabama HB 56 contributed to an increase in violent crime
rates, while there was no significant change in property crime rates after the act.
Our study is motivated by a recent interest in the literature to evaluate anti-illegal immigrant
laws. For instance, using a synthetic control method, Bohn et al. (2014) find that the 2007 Legal
Arizona Workers Act substantially reduced the proportion of undocumented immigrants in the
population of Arizona. Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman (2017) examined the effect of Arizona SB
1070 on the undocumented immigrants’ individual decisions regarding their migration destination.
Their results show that the passage of the bill significantly reduced unauthorized immigration to
Arizona by 70%. Our study focuses on the causal effect of Alabama HB 56 on crime, rather than
the direct effect on the proportion of unlawfully present immigrants.
Bell et al. (2013) conducted a similar study where they examined the relationship between
crime and immigration in the UK during the 1990s and 2000s. They found that preventing asylum
seekers from finding jobs resulted in increases in property crime, but had no impact on violent
crime. We use a different estimation framework and focus on the evaluation of the treatment effect
of anti-illegal immigrant laws on crime in Alabama. In contrast to their finding, Alabama HB 56
increased violent crime but had no impact on property crime.
Our results can be linked to literature after Becker (1968), who modeled criminal behavior from
a rational decision analysis based on the benefits and opportunity costs. In general, unemployment
status decreases the opportunity cost of criminal behavior. Fleisher (1966) and Ehrlich (1973)
documented the significant causal effect of unemployment on criminal activities in the US. Since
the Alabama HB 56 restricts undocumented immigrants from taking job positions, it is expected
to increase criminal activities. However, there is also literature suggesting that increasing police
force can reduce crime (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004; Levitt, 2002). According to this view,
the increase in immigration police force due to Alabama HB 56 may reduce crime. In spite of the
contradictory predictions, our results support the former; the anti-immigrant law is more likely to
increase violent crime.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follow. Section 2.2 introduces the institutional background.
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Section 2.3 describes the methodology and data. Section 2.4 presents the results. Section 2.5
performs placebo tests to provide statistical inference, and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
The Alabama HB 56 Bill passed in June 2011 imposes extreme restrictions to undocumented
immigrants in Alabama. It requires every public elementary and secondary school to determine
whether students were born outside of the US or if their parents are undocumented. The Bill makes
it a felony for an undocumented immigrant to “enter into any business transaction with a govern-
ment agency”. It also prohibits signing rental agreements or providing housing accommodations
for undocumented immigrants. Similar to other immigration acts, Alabama HB 56 also requires
“every business entity or employer in the state to enroll in E-Verify”, the federal government’s
online database used to check the employment eligibility of workers. As a consequence, undocu-
mented immigrants have fewer opportunities for education, employment and businesses, thereby
lowering opportunity cost for criminal behaviors.
2.3 Methodology and Data
To evaluate the effect of HB 56, one needs to find a comparable counterfactual for Alabama.
This paper employs a data-driven method to construct a synthetic Alabama, which is a weighted
average over all the control states. In the framework of the synthetic control method, J is the
number of states, j = 1 is the treated state, Alabama. The rest of the states from j = 2, ., J
are the potential control alternatives constituting a “donor pool” to construct a synthetic Alabama.
Define Y Cjt and Y
T
jt as the outcome of unit j at time t in the control group and treatment group
respectively. Let W = w1, w2, , wJ−1 be the (J − 1) × 1 vector of weights, with 0 ≤ wj < 1 and
w1 + w2 + + wJ−1 = 1. By choosing the proper W ∗, the following minimization problem can be
solved at t = T0, the pre-intervention period.
W ∗ = argminW (Y T1t − Y Ct W )′(Y T1t − Y Ct W )
Then, the treatment effect can be calculated by applying W ∗ to t = T1 post-intervention period.
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Our outcome variables are crime rates at the state level which are obtained from the FBI’s Uni-
form Crime Reporting (UCR) statistics from 1998 to 2014. To construct the synthetic Alabama, we
combine state-level police labor force data from 1998 to 2014 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) and calculate per capita statistics. We further control for state differences in death penalty
legality.
Since Fajnzylber et al. (2002) find that cultural characteristics such as religion views and illicit
drug use can affect an individual’s propensity to crime, we use the percentage of respondents who
identify as Christian from Gallup’s polling data (2006-2014).
Due to data limitations, we use the number of hospital admission for primary substance abuse
as control for illicit drug use. Specifically, we control alcohol and marijuana use per 100,000
habitants (accessed from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration).
There is substantial evidence documenting how income inequality contributes to crime be-
havior, in particular violent crimes (Blau and Blau, 1982). Thus, the Gini index in the Ameri-
can Community Survey (2006-2014), and unemployment status in the Current Population Survey
(1998-2014) are also included.
Regarding demographic aspects, we use the proportion of non-citizen Hispanics over 15-year-
old without high school education as the proportion of the population most likely to be undocu-
mented (Bohn et al., 2014).
Over the past decade, several states have launched their own immigration regulations. States
impacted by similar interventions should be excluded from the donor pool (Abadie et al., 2015),
thus we remove all the states that passed E-verify or Omnibus Immigration Legislation (OIL)
around the same period.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Violent crime
While evaluating the impact of Alabama HB56 on violent crime, synthetic Alabama was con-
structed by a combination of Kentucky (42.1%), Oklahoma (40.6%), Florida (9.6%), and New
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Mexico (7.6%), with W ∗ displayed in the parentheses. Table 2.1 reports the pre-intervention com-
parison for Alabama and synthetic Alabama. The synthetic Alabama provides a close reproduction
of Alabama.
Table 2.1: Crime Rate Predictors: Mean Trends (1998-2010)
Alabama Synthetic Alabama Synthetic
Violent crime rate 447.82 447.10 Hispanic noncitizen at least 15
White 0.69 0.82 with less than high school 0.01 0.01
Age under 18 0.25 0.25 Gini index 0.47 0.46
Age 18-44 0.35 0.35 Primary marijuana admission 139.17 94.47
Age 45-64 0.26 0.26 Primary alcohol admission 181.08 227.38
Less than high school 0.24 0.21 Detectives and criminal investigator 22.69 25.67
High school 0.33 0.33 Police and sheriff’s patrol officers 206.04 190.99
Christian 0.87 0.83 Security guards 305.97 282.84
Unemployment rate 0.05 0.05 Death penalty 1.00 0.99
Figure 2.1 shows the trends for violent crime cases per 100,000 people in Alabama and syn-
thetic Alabama. The magnitude of the estimated impact of HB 56 is significant in the post-
intervention period. In the pre-intervention periods (1998-2010), the violent crime rate for syn-
thetic Alabama is fairly close to the rate in actual Alabama showing a good model fit.
Figure 2.1: Trends in Violent Crime Cases
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2.4.2 Property crime
Figure 2.2 displays the total property crime rates from 2002 to 2014. There is no evidence of
an impact of the immigration policy. Alabama and synthetic Alabama both experienced a decline
in property crime rates during 2008-2014.
Figure 2.2: Trends in Property Crime Cases
2.5 Placebo Studies and Robustness Test
To validate our finding regarding violent crime, we implement placebo studies and robustness
checks for inference (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). In the placebo studies, we repeatedly assign the
intervention to each of the control states in the donor pool which did not enact anti-illegal immi-
grant laws during the same period. If a significant placebo effect is detected, then the estimated
shift for Alabama would be seriously undermined.
Figure 2.3 displays the placebo test excluding states with pre-treatment periods’ mean squared
prediction error (MSPE) larger than twice of Alabama. MSPE measures the magnitude of the
difference in the outcome variable between the treated unit and its synthetic counterpart (Abadie
et al., 2010, 2015). The states with large fluctuating MSPE in the pre-treatment period will not
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provide valid information. The black line denotes the gap in the outcome variable between the
treated and synthetic control group, while the gray lines represent the gaps in each of the iterative
application of intervention for the units in the donor pool. Twenty-two controls states and Alabama
are presented in Figure 2.3. Alabama displays the largest gap-line in the post-intervention period.
According to Abadie et al. (2010), the probability of estimating such a magnitude of gap-line under
the random treatment assignment is as low as 1/22, which in terms of the inference interpretation
means a p-value of lower than 5%.
Figure 2.3: Violent Crime Gaps in Alabama and Placebo Tests in 22 Control States
We also perform the placebo tests by examining the distribution of post-pre MSPE ratio across
states. A large post-period MSPE does not validate the treatment induced shift unless the post-pre
period ratio of MSPE is also large. Figure 2.4 reports how this ratio spreads across Alabama and
all the other 37 control states. Alabama has a value of post-period about 27 times larger than the
pre-period. If the treatment is randomly assigned to any state in the donor pool, the probability of
obtaining a MSPE ratio as large as Alabama’s is 1/37 = 0.027.
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Figure 2.4: Ratio of Post/Pre-HB56 MSPE: Alabama and 37 Control States
We further implement the sensitivity test by leaving out the four states with positive weights
one at a time and re-estimating the model. Figure 2.5 plots the four synthetic groups constructed by
leaving one state out together with the reproduction of Figure 2.1. As seen, our result for violent
crime is robust to the exclusion of any particular state with positive weight. All leave-one-out
synthetic groups present similar effects to our findings. By sacrificing some extent of goodness of
fit, it demonstrates our result is not driven by any particular state.
2.6 Conclusion
The recent waves of anti-immigrant regulation have been paid interest from researchers and
governments. In this paper, we estimate the causal effect of the harshest anti-immigration bill,
Alabama HB 56, on crime using a synthetic control approach. We provide suggestive evidence
of heterogeneous effects of Alabama HB 56 on violent crime and property crime. Although this
anti-immigrant bill did not affect property crime in Alabama, violent crime significantly increased
after the bill was enacted.
The intention of this act is to reduce the amount of illegal immigrants living in Alabama and
create a better socio-economic environment for the local citizens. However, its consequences
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Figure 2.5: Leave-One-Out Distribution of the Synthetic Control for Alabama
are contradictory to the expectations. There is evidence for the negative economic consequences
caused by the passage of this act. HB 56 is estimated to cost Alabama as much as $11 billion
in economic output and another $264.5 million in tax revenue (Addy, 2012). And in this study
we find unintended effect on violent crime rate. This calls for the state government to take the
potential negative side effects into consideration while adjusting future immigration-related bills.
Our results can be linked to the literature in which criminal behavior is analyzed based on the
benefits and opportunity costs Becker (1968). Since Alabama HB56 restricts the employment of
undocumented immigrants, it is expected to increase criminal activities because of lower opportu-
nity cost of criminal behavior, although no effect is found on property crime. On the other hand,
increased crimes may also be committed against undocumented immigrants, since undocumented
victims have less incentive to report crimes against them. Due to lack of available data, whether
the increase in violent crimes is committed by undocumented immigrants or against them merits
further investigation.
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3. THE IMPACT OF THE H-1B CAP EXEMPTION ON PH.D. LABOR MARKET
3.1 Introduction
Immigration policy is currently one of the most widely discussed topics in government and
among regular citizens. It is a sensitive issue that carries strongly polarized views. The majority of
immigration arguments are centered around low-skilled, low-paying jobs. We, on the other hand,
concentrate on high-skilled labor markets, through which foreign professionals are normally hired
using the H-1B visa program. There are competing views among researchers and policy makers
on whether the US government should assign more visas to allow foreign high-skilled workers to
stay in the US labor market; or make the current immigration policy stricter with the argument
that immigrants displace native US workers. Policy changes surrounding the H-1B temporary visa
program have been heatedly debated since the program was first implemented in the 1990s.
The H-1B program administrates the eligibility of full-time employment for most US trained
high-skilled immigrants. In particular, for newly graduated foreign-born professionals including
all academic degree holders, the H-1B visa program is possibly the only path to legally enter into
the US labor market.1 The volume of H-1B petitions is almost always larger than the number of
available visas. As a result, the US Citizens and Immigration Services (USCIS) sets quotas for the
number of H-1B visas to be issued every year. The cap was 115,000 in 1999 and 2000; 195,000
from 2001 to 2003; and 65,000 after 2004, with an additional 20,000 for applicants holding at least
a Master’s degree.2 For some years, the excessive number of petitions even prompted the USCIS
to utilize lottery procedures to arrange for visa assignments.
The American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act (AC 21) was signed into law
in October, 2000 (U.S. Congress, 2000). It had one key provision: the H-1B visa would not be
subjected to the annual quotas for applicants employed by higher education institutions, nonprofit
research organizations, and government research organizations. The enactment of AC 21 marks
1We refer here to an employment-based visa. It is also possible for foreign workers to enter the labor market
through marriage with a US citizen.
2https://www.uscis.gov/
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the beginning of the H-1B exemption in the numerical cap for research oriented institutions. As a
result, it potentially affects the job preferences of non-citizen college graduates seeking to stay in
the United States after graduation. Choosing a career in an uncapped H-1B qualified entity makes
the foreign-born Ph.D. graduates to circumvent the risk of facing the fiercely competitive H-1B ap-
plication process and possibly avoiding potential losses due to a visa rejection. The mechanism to
establish a potential causal relationship is further implemented through the clause stating that “any
individual who is on an uncapped H-1B visa will be counted towards the cap if he/she switches
to a job that is subject to a cap” (U.S. Congress, 2000). According to these terms, AC 21 would
impose a direct effect on the job preference in academia, while having only an indirect (or second
degree) effect on the job preference in industry.
The intent-to-treat effect from AC 21 possibly affects all students who graduated with any
academic degree, but jobs in academia or research institutions in general require a doctoral degree.
Thus, we concentrate on the identification of causal effects on Ph.D holders as they participate in
high-skilled labor markets and are important drivers of innovation and discovery in science and
industry (Cohen et al., 2002; Stuen et al., 2012).
Our Difference-in-Difference estimates suggest a strong causal relationship between AC 21
and the job preferences of Ph.D holders in academia and industry labor markets. We find that
after the implementation of AC 21, foreign Ph.D graduates are 5% more likely to pursue a job in
academia, and 3-4% less likely to choose an industry job compared to U.S. domestic graduates.
Placebo experiments and falsification tests exclude the possibility of other external changes around
the same time period driving these results.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, we document the literature
and motivation. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the institutional details of AC 21. Section
4 provides an overview of the data and presents descriptive results of our analysis. Section 5
introduces our identification strategy, where we leverage individual level variation in the visa status
to identify the effects of AC 21 on job placement. Section 6 reports the results. In Section 7, we
discuss the two inference strategies that we use and present results for the placebo experiments
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and falsification test. Section 8 explores heterogeneous effects by doctoral field and section 8
concludes.
3.2 Literature and Motivation
The linkage between the H-1B program and high-skilled labor markets is profound. Most
immigrant scientists and engineers started their careers in the United States via this visa program
and they are now making substantial contributions to the US economy and advancing technological
development (Peri, 2007; Anderson and Platzer, 2006; Wadhwa et al., 2007).3 In this sense, a
relaxed visa policy for high-skilled immigrants allows experts from a wide range of fields to stay
in the US labor market after completing their studies, producing benefits over the long run.
Yet, the debate about the short-run effects of the H-1B visa program is still unsettled. On
one hand, high-skilled immigrants provide both critical contributions in fundamental research and
auxiliary skills in management and entrepreneurship. For instance, Kerr and Lincoln (2010) found
that a 10% increase in the H-1B population resulted in around 4% higher growth in the number
of noncitizen scientists and engineers without displacement impacts on their native counterparts.
Further, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) document that an increase in the share of immigrant
college graduates induces a sizable positive spill-over effect on innovation. By leveraging the
lottery assignment of H-1B as an exogenous intervention in computer-related occupation markets,
Peri et al. (2014a) showed that negative shocks in H-1B assignment generated from the lottery
process reduced employment and the growth rate of wages for native workers; this result suggests
a complementary relationship between native and foreign workers. Similarly, Islam et al. (2017)
found that the increase of skilled immigrants in a particular group raised the wages of both native
and immigrants from that group. Using historical data, Moser et al. (2014) document a productivity
boost on fellow Chemistry researchers following the immigration of Jewish scientists from Nazi
Germany.
On the other hand, a crowding-out influence from the influx of high-skilled immigrants on
domestic workers is also supported by the literature. This effect was found either through direct
3 Kerr (2013) provides a review of the contributions of immigrants to US innovation and entrepreneurship.
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displacement or by lowering wage rates. For instance, the influx of foreign mathematicians after
the Soviet Union collapse temporarily displaced American mathematicians in the academic labor
market (Borjas and Doran, 2012). Evidence from Borjas (2005) showed that the inflow of foreign
doctorate students had negative impacts on the earnings of native Ph.D graduates within the same
field. Further, a series of studies discussed the substitutability of immigrants and natives through
examining their wage rate relationship (e.g. John and Zimmermann, 1994; Borjas, 2003; Islam,
2009; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012, etc.).
Motivated by these previous studies, we exploit the impact of exogenous variation in immi-
gration policy on high-skilled labor markets through examining the job placement preference of
foreign-born Ph.D graduates. Our analysis is useful for assessing immigration policy effects on
high-skilled immigrants and for understanding subsequent complementary/displacing effects that
immigrants have on their native counterparts. However, the majority of previous immigration re-
search concentrates on US domestic workers. The effects of immigration policy changes on foreign
high-skilled professionals has not receive much attention until recently. Lan (2012, 2013) focused
on the effect of Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 on Chinese Ph.D postdoctoral placement,
wage rates, and the number of patents subsequently filed in the United States. Kato and Spar-
ber (2013) investigated the relationship between the variation generated from the reduced H-1B
visa cap around 2003 and the SAT scores of international college applicants. Later, Shih (2016)
examined the effect of this visa cap change on college enrollment of international students.
The most thematically relevant study to our paper is Amuedo-Dorantes and Furtado (2017).
The authors leveraged the differentiation in the availability of H-1B substitute visas for students
from different countries and explored how the visa cap reduction affected foreign individuals jobs
in academia. The authors use the National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG) data source to
focus on the job market for science and engineering(S&E).4
However, our research design and data provide a distinct perspective for a broader study pop-
ulation. We focus on how the relaxation in the immigration policy affects foreign-born doctoral
4As one of the three surveys in the Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT surveys), National
Survey of College Graduates (NSCG) has its target population focusing on the S&E workers.
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recipients’ selection into the academic market. From the design point of view, our article studies
the H-1B cap exemption regulated from the AC 21 policy. We employ the variation in nation-
ality (domestic/foreign) to examine intent-to-treat effects. More importantly, our study employs
licensed data from a census of Ph.D holders of all academic majors. Using data of Ph.D recipi-
ents from all academic fields is useful to understand foreign professionals’ selection into different
academic labor markets.
A significant amount of literature explores the H-1B program influence normally using a re-
stricted sample of individuals within STEM fields (e.g. Kerr and Lincoln, 2010; Mithas and Lu-
cas Jr, 2010; Hunt, 2011; Peri, Shih, and Sparber, 2014a,b; Kerr, Kerr, and Lincoln, 2015; Hunt,
2015; Peri, Shih, and Sparber, 2015, etc.). We add to the literature on H-1B program analysis by
extending it to all academic fields and achieving better external validity than previous studies.
3.3 Visa Policy and Job Choices
AC 21 passed in January 2000, and it was signed into law in October of the same year by Pres-
ident Clinton. It intended to enhance the effectiveness and portability of the H-1B visa program.
The key provision relevant to our study is the special rule allowing universities and research insti-
tutions to hire as many foreign-born graduates as they need without being subjected to the annual
H-1B quotas.
While there are no specific educational level requirements in AC 21, we argue that the primary
treatment effect would be on foreign nationals with doctoral degrees. The favorable visa condi-
tions of AC 21 would potentially motivate all noncitizen graduates to favor academic and research
institutions more than other employment prospects. However, academic positions normally require
applicants to have a doctoral degree and a strong research background. In this sense, the uptake
of the treatment induced by AC 21 would come first and foremost from doctorate recipients. In
the following sections, we identify the primary treatment effect on all Ph.D graduates and exploit
possible heterogeneous effects by academic fields.
Aside from the annual H-1B quota, foreign-born graduates also face many other constraints
when pursuing a job in the United States. After graduation, they are required to file a 12-month
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Optional Practical Training (OPT) certificate while applying for the H-1B working visa. Failing
to receive an H-1B visa before the OPT expires leaves the prospective worker with a 60-day grace
period to leave the country.
In addition, the extra cost incurred during the H-1B application may be significant for small
businesses, considering that foreign professionals are paid at the same level as domestic workers.
In some cases, in order to hedge the additional costs, companies may offer lower salaries to H-
1B recipients compared to American citizens. Moreover, businesses may have less incentives to
invest in professional development, training and promotion opportunities for H-1B workers, since
they might be mobile if the employer can not provide further sponsorship for a legal permanent
residence application. 5
The enactment of AC 21 significantly reduces potential losses due to a visa rejection, and to
a great extent helps foreign-born graduates to avoid the above mentioned constraints, as long as
they commit to work in a cap-exempt research institution. Accordingly, the entry barriers become
relatively higher for working in industry after the adoption of AC 21. Taking together, jobs in
research related institutions may become more attractive after the AC21 policy intervention.
On the other hand, the disadvantages of working in academia, nonprofit and government re-
search institutions are not negligible. The income in these institutions tends to be generous, but
it is usually lower than in industry, especially at the entry level. Potential promotions or large
salary increases are unusual during the first several years of working in universities and research
institutions.
The highly competitive market situation for jobs in academia and research institutions also
indicates that the most qualified professionals would probably have opportunities in both academia
and industry. The exogenous shock generated from AC 21 will exercise most of its influence on
the top qualified foreign doctoral graduates who are potential candidates to both job markets. We
hypothesize that with lower barriers to enter the US academic job market, AC 21 may induce
individuals to choose a career in H-1B exempted institutions.
5http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/30/smallbusiness/immigrant-tech-canada/index.html
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Temporary Residents US Citizen
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.
Total number of graduates 82136 293386
Graduates with definite plans 55768 211517
Demographics
Male 40382 0.724 0.447 108657 0.514 0.500
Age: 16-25 731 0.013 0.114 1224 0.006 0.076
Age: 26-40 50563 0.916 0.278 145046 0.690 0.463
Father with at least college degree 32429 0.587 0.492 120050 0.572 0.495
Mother with at least college degree 22413 0.406 0.491 97298 0.462 0.499
Single in marital status 19874 0.358 0.480 57218 0.272 0.445
White 14109 0.254 0.435 175772 0.834 0.372
Asian 37042 0.666 0.472 9883 0.047 0.211
Hispanic 2577 0.046 0.210 8922 0.042 0.202
Graduated in public school 38519 0.691 0.462 144805 0.685 0.465
Broadly Classified Doctoral Fields
Agriculture 567 0.020 0.139 2919 0.020 0.139
Biological/Biomedical Sciences 1011 0.035 0.184 7043 0.047 0.212
Health Sciences 724 0.025 0.157 6809 0.046 0.209
Engineering 10856 0.378 0.485 13260 0.089 0.285
Computer and Information Sciences 2260 0.079 0.269 2834 0.019 0.137
Mathematics 1589 0.055 0.229 2703 0.018 0.133
Physical Sciences 2572 0.090 0.286 8454 0.057 0.231
Psychology 397 0.014 0.117 13115 0.088 0.283
Social Sciences 3312 0.115 0.319 14288 0.096 0.294
Humanities 1889 0.066 0.248 24554 0.165 0.371
Education 870 0.030 0.171 41469 0.278 0.448
Business Management/Administration 2042 0.071 0.257 5373 0.036 0.186
Communication 328 0.011 0.106 2254 0.015 0.122
Fields Not Elsewhere Classified 312 0.011 0.104 4079 0.027 0.163
Outcomes
Working in Academia 11004 0.383 0.486 80145 0.537 0.499
Working in Industry 15706 0.547 0.498 24378 0.163 0.370
Source: Survey of Earned Doctorates, 1995 to 2006.
“Total graduates” represents Ph.D holders who intend to stay in the US within the next year after graduation.
“Graduates with definite plan” represents individuals with determined study or employment plans and intend to stay in
the US for the following year.
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3.4 Data
We employ licensed data from the Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED) to execute the quan-
titative analysis. The SED is a unique annual census conducted since the 1950s. It covers Ph.D
graduates from U.S. universities across all fields of study. The survey is implemented at the time
of graduation, and hence the response rate is over 90%. We extract micro level data from 1995
to 2006. This time period covers the population of Ph.D graduates who may have been affected
by the implementation of AC 21. Data after 2006 is not included in order to construct a clean
identification and to rule out potential confounding factors generated from the Great Recession of
2007-2009. The SED also provides detailed information of individual level characteristics, immi-
gration status and post-graduation employment. Since the exogenous shock from AC 21 occurred
in 2000, we draw data from six years before and six years after the visa policy change.
The descriptive statistics of the data are shown in Table 3.1. Our analysis is restricted to Ph.D
graduates intending to stay in the U.S. after graduation. From the demand side, whether an in-
dividual is willing to stay in the United States is affected by the job market conditions of the
United States, their home countries and other countries, since holding a doctoral degree from an
English speaking country potentially opens the door to global placement. We assume these condi-
tions collectively are exogenous at the time of graduation for a doctorate student. From the supply
side, significant world events around the time of the implementation of AC 21 would most likely
randomly affect the job preference for academia or industry.
As seen, around 70% of the doctorate recipients, both citizens and foreign-born, have definite
plans for employment, study or postdoctoral training after graduation. Of these individuals, half
have definite employment plan. Starting from 2004, SED only collect the data of the prospect
employers for individuals who indicate they do have a definite work plan. SED does not pro-
vide follow-up information regarding the placement of individuals who indicate they do not have
definite work plans. Accordingly, we implement the causal analysis with sample restricted to in-
dividuals with definite post-graduation plans.6 If most of the remaining doctorate recipients, who
6The Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR) collects additional individual level data on post-graduation plans, but
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did not have definite employment plans at the time of the survey end up working in academia
(industry), then our estimated effect on academic job choice is underestimated (overestimated).
The empirical identification is based on individual level variation in the visa status. Ph.D hold-
ers with temporary visas are the most affected cohort and serve as the treatment group, while their
US citizen counterparts serve as the comparison group.7 In the top panel of Table 3.1, we sum-
marize the demographic characteristics of temporary residents and U.S. citizens. The two cohorts
differ in many aspects. Males account for 72% of Ph.D recipients with temporary visas while only
for 51% of U.S. citizens. By nature, the two groups also show substantial racial differences. The
association of interest between the policy change and the job market choice could potentially be
driven by treatment and control differences in socioeconomic characteristics. Spurious causal re-
lations can be generated if we fail to adequately control for these observable differences. Thus, we
control for individual level demographic information in our extended model specifications.
Individuals from different fields of study face different labor market conditions. Potential het-
erogeneity across fields of study may also differ across the treatment and comparison groups. The
second panel in Table 3.1 shows the differences between foreign and U.S. citizen Ph.Ds in each
academic field. The statistics present for the sample focused on individuals with definite employ-
ment plans. The majority of native doctorate recipients with earned their doctorates in Humanities
and Education; whereas most foreign graduates hold doctorates in Engineering. Effectively con-
trolling the divergence in preferences for doctoral fields is also critical in capturing the potential
causal effects from AC 21. To exclude the possibility that the causal effects are driven by changes
in the labor market conditions of some specific fields, we allow for flexible interactions of field and
time indicators, and explore potential heterogeneous effects by each doctoral field.
Finally, the outcome variables are presented in the last panel of Table 3.1. “Working in
only for a stratified subsample of science and engineering Ph.D.
7We exclude the cohort of permanent residents from the analysis for two reasons. First, there is an endogeneity
concern of visa status among foreign-born Ph.D recipients. There may be some underlying factors that affect both
their job preferences and visa status (e.g. unobserved family backgrounds). It is also possible that the permanent visa
status was obtained after earning their Ph.D due to unobserved individual skills and research experience or due to a
green card lottery procedure. Both of these factors can drive respondents to favor or reject an academic position. The
second concern is the parallel assumption. We test this assumption empirically and find that it is not satisfied for job
choices neither in academia nor industry labor markets for green card holders.
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academia” is defined as working in a 4-year college or university, medical school, university-
affiliated research institute or community college, which are the options offered in the question-
naire. In addition to working in academia or industry, other respondents stated they would be
working in federal/local/foreign government or self-employed. Although the three types of cap
exempt entities stipulated in AC 21 involve “government research institutions”, there is no further
breakdown under this category in the data source.8
3.5 Empirical Strategy
It is possible that the change in the outcome variables between native and foreign Ph.Ds could
be driven by inherent differences in the job market conditions of different fields of study. To isolate
the causal effect of AC 21 from other potential confounding factors, we implement a Difference-in-
Difference estimation using major and academic field fixed effects. That is, we examine whether
the probability of working in academia/industry differs more over time for foreign Ph.Ds than
domestic Ph.Ds mainly through within-field/major comparisons.
Figure 3.1 plots the time trends of the two outcome variables for all doctoral fields combined.
The outcome variables for domestic and foreign-born cohorts follow a similar time trend before
the policy intervention. After the policy was implemented (vertical line), there is a sizable shifting
pattern for foreign Ph.Ds but not for domestic Ph.Ds. This provides suggestive evidence of an
impact from the AC 21 policy intervention. Within five years of the implementation of AC 21, this
external shock stimulates a significant increase in the probability of working in academia and a
decrease in the proportion of foreign Ph.Ds working in industry.
8Working in government as a researcher could be inferred from the database; however, it is not equivalent to
working in a government research institution. Note that self-employed is not permitted for foreign nationals. Hence,
in order to have a clean identification strategy, we concentrate on the potential causal effects of AC 21 on academia
and industry.
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Figure 3.1: Time Trend of the Share of Graduates Working in Academia
We further disaggregate academic fields into STEM and non-STEM categories and plot the
time trends separately in Figure 3.2.9 Panel (a) shows the placement trajectory of academic jobs,
9To leverage the potential variation of job preferences and immigration risk confronted by foreign Ph.Ds in dif-
ferent academic fields, we define STEM majors according to the U.S. immigration and customs enforcement (ICE).
Specifically, the STEM categorization we apply is the one used by ICE to regulate which majors are eligible for the
revised OPT extension announced in 2008.
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and panel (b) for industry jobs. Consistent with our previous findings, both foreign STEM and non-
STEM majors follow different time trends after AC 21. The effects for foreign graduates in STEM
fields are more pronounced than non-STEM majors. This result further supports our hypothesis of
heterogeneous effects across academic fields.
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Figure 3.2: Time Trend of the Share of Graduates Working in Academia, By STEM Field
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The key identifying assumption of the DID strategy is that in the absence of AC 21, the treat-
ment and comparison groups would have experienced similar changes in the probability of work-
ing in academia or industry. Visual tests for Figures 3.1 and 3.2 suggest that this assumption is
satisfied. To quantitatively capture the treatment effect on job market choices, we establish our
estimation model using individual level variation in visa status and graduation time, before and
after the policy shock:
Yifmt = γf + ωm + λt + δDft +Xiftβ + ifmt (3.1)
where the outcome variable Yift is a binary indicator equal to 1 if individual i with foreign na-
tionality f obtained his Ph.D degree in year t and worked in academia after graduation, or zero
for having an industry job after graduation. The parameters γf , ωm and λt are nationality, major
and year fixed effects, which capture all the unobserved variations in the outcome variable over
citizenship, major and year. Xift are individual characteristics, including race, gender, parent’s
education, marital status, and university characteristics.10 Dft is our primary measure for the treat-
ment variable, and it is equal to 1 for foreign Ph.Ds who graduated after the adoption of AC 21.
The related parameter δ , indicates the estimated treatment effect. Standard errors are clustered at
the fourteen broadly classified academic fields.11 Due to idiosyncratic features of each doctorate
academic field, our baseline specification includes both major and year fixed effects. In order to
allow for different disciplines to have distinct trajectories over time, we extend equation 3.1 to
include major-specific linear trends. We also estimate specifications that incorporate field-by-year
fixed effects to further allow majors of different fields to accommodate differential shocks over
time. The results from these specifications and the inclusion of demographic variables serve as
augmentations and robustness checks for the baseline results. If the estimated treatment effect
changes drastically in any of these extensions, it would indicate that either socioeconomic factors
or idiosyncratic trends explain the outcome effects and the baseline parameter may not be associ-
10We exclude demographic variables in the baseline model.
11We follow the classification in the SED data set to define the broad doctoral academic fields. The list of fields is
presented in Table 3.1.
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ated with the exogenous shock that we intend to identify. As our point estimates shown in Section
3.6, this is not the case and the additional models support the general results.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Empirical Results
Our baseline estimates for academic and industry job markets are shown in column (1) of Ta-
bles 3.2 and 3.3. Following the baseline results are the estimates for extended specifications which
are shown in columns (2) to (4) of these two tables. In addition to the DID linear probability model,
we also use a DID probit specification to estimate Equation 3.1. Estimates for the two models are
shown in panel A and B of these tables respectively. The results for the linear estimation shown in
Table 3.2 indicate that after implementing AC 21, foreign born Ph.Ds are 5% more likely to work
in academia than domestic Ph.D graduates. The marginal effect for the probit specification implies
an even larger influence, with foreign Ph.D graduates being 7% more likely to work in academic
jobs. Our point estimate is robust to the inclusion of controls for idiosyncratic shocks by doctoral
fields over time in column (2) and controls for demographic characteristics in column (3). In col-
umn (4), we further incorporate major-specific linear time trends into the model, in order to allow
for each major to follow a differential trajectory. The parameter of interest remains unchanged.
These point estimates are robust and significant at the 1% level throughout all specifications. The
results provide suggestive evidence that pre-post variation in job market preferences over cohorts
of different visa status is not correlated with other determinants of the outcome variable. Thus, we
argue that the estimated effect is driven by the AC 21 policy intervention rather than other factors.
Similarly, Table 3.3 displays analogous estimates for industry job choice. Across all specifica-
tions, the estimated parameters are statistically significant at the 1% level. The results show that
following AC 21, foreign Ph.D graduates are less likely to work in industry than before the policy
intervention. The magnitude of the reduction in probability is around 3 - 4%. The absolute value of
the point estimate decreases slightly when we include socioeconomic control variables and other
controls for differential trends by doctoral fields and majors.
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Table 3.2: Treatment Effect of AC 21 on Job Placement in Academia
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable
A. Linear Difference in Difference Estimation
Noncitizen Ph.Ds Graduated after AC 21 0.047 0.057 0.047 0.047
(0.002)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)***
[0.017]*** [0.019]*** [0.018]*** [0.016]***
Observations 177883 177883 173409 173409
B. Probit Difference in Difference Estimation
0.076 0.083 0.073 0.073
(0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
Observations 177861 177861 173388 173388
Year and Major Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field-Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Major-Specific Linear Time Trends No No No Yes
Demographic Variables No No Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Each cell indicates a separate regression. The dependent variable is whether individual response to place
in academia at the time of answering the questionnaire. The explanatory variable of interest refers to noncitizen
Ph.Ds who graduated after the adoption of AC 21. Data is restricted to doctorate recipients who have determined
plan for employment and intend to stay in the US in the immediate following year. Field-Year fixed effect controls
for 385 doctoral majors. Robust standard errors clustered at fourteen broadly classified doctoral fields are shown in
parentheses. Following the spirit of Cameron et al. (2011), we additionally implement multi-way clustering at year
(12 clusters) and broad doctoral field (14 clusters) for the linear probability model and these standard errors are shown
in brackets.
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Table 3.3: Treatment Effect of AC 21 on Job Placement in Industry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable
A. Linear Difference in Difference Estimation
Noncitizen Ph.Ds Graduated after AC 21 -0.054 -0.047 -0.041 -0.038
(0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)***
[0.010]*** [0.015]*** [0.018]** [0.015]**
Observations 177883 177883 173409 173409
B. Probit Difference in Difference Estimation
-0.032 -0.031 -0.028 -0.025
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
Observations 177578 177578 173113 173113
Year and Major Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field-Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Major-Specific Linear Time Trends No No No Yes
Demographic Variables No No Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Each cell indicates a separate regression. The dependent variable is whether individual response to place in
industry at the time of answering the questionnaire. The explanatory variable of interest refers to noncitizen Ph.Ds
who graduated after the adoption of AC 21. Data is restricted to doctorate recipients who have determined plan
for employment and intend to stay in the US in the immediate following year. Field-Year fixed effect controls for
385 doctoral majors. Robust standard errors clustered at fourteen broadly classified doctoral fields are shown in
parentheses. Following the spirit of Cameron et al. (2011), we additionally implement multi-way clustering at year
(12 clusters) and broad doctoral field (14 clusters) for the linear probability model and these standard errors are shown
in brackets.
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It suggests that the assessment of AC 21 on the job preference in industry is impacted by vari-
ations in doctoral field/major trends and demographic characteristics. This is plausible since the
direct effect of AC 21 is primarily exercised on job choice in academia, and hence the inclination
of working in industry assumes an indirect effect. Meanwhile, opportunities to work in govern-
ment and self-employment for native graduates might also have spillover effects on the probability
of foreign Ph.Ds to work in industry. These unobserved influencing elements are proxied by so-
cioeconomic and field heterogeneity covariates. Accordingly, additionally controlling for these
variables has impact on the magnitude of the point estimates for industry jobs.
3.6.2 Dynamic Difference-in-Difference Estimation
We perform further analysis using the dynamic Difference-in-Difference estimates in the spirit
of Cheng and Hoekstra (2013). Specifically, the treatment and control difference of the outcome
variable is estimated two/three years prior to the treatment (one year prior to treatment, the year
of treatment, one year after treatment, two years after treatment and three years after treatment)
relative to the average treatment and control difference four years or more prior to the treatment.
By allowing for dynamic divergence between the treatment and control groups over time, this pro-
cedure detects how the treatment effect evolves over time. The identification design is invalidated
if a significant jump in the dynamic DID coefficients is observed before the year of the treatment.
That is, the possibility of other external factors driving the estimated effect cannot be excluded if
the highest departing pattern did not appear immediately after the treatment.
Based on Equation 3.1, we build our dynamic Difference-in-Difference estimation model as:
Yifmt = γf + ωm + λt +
t+3∑
k=t−3
δkDft +Xiftβ + ifmt (3.2)
where the associated coefficients of Dft are the dynamic DID estimates.
The dynamic DID results are shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 for academia and industry respec-
tively. We include additional control variables for demographic factors and allow for academic
field specific shocks from the baseline model. For both outcome variables of interest, there is no
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evidence of a significant jump before the enactment of AC 21. The average pre-period coefficient
is about 0.6% for academic jobs and 0.5% for industry jobs. Following the passage of AC 21,
we observe notable differences in the estimated job preference for both job markets. The mag-
nitude is as large as 9% increase at the peak in academia and 8% decrease at the dip in industry
jobs. Throughout the post AC 21 period, the average treatment effect for the academic job market
amounts to 5.6% and -4.1% for industry. These results are consistent and almost identical to the
traditional DID estimates.
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Figure 3.3: Change in the Share of Graduates Working in Academia, Relative to the Difference in
Four or More Years Before AC 21
3.7 Robustness
3.7.1 Inference
In Tables 3.2 and 3.3, we show the robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the aca-
demic field level. To further investigate the robustness of the results, we implement two additional
strategies on inference. The first one is multi-way clustering following Cameron et al. (2011). We
specify the robust standard errors clustered at the year and academic field level and re-estimate the
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Figure 3.4: Change in the Share of Graduates Working in Industry, Relative to the Difference in
Four or More Years Before AC 21
regression across all the specifications. As shown in the brackets of these two tables, the statistical
significance does not change at all for the outcome variable of academic job preference. The sig-
nificance level changes slightly in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.3 for industry jobs. Consistent
with our previous discussion (See section 3.6.1), this again suggests that the job preference in in-
dustry assumes a less direct effect from AC 21, and it is sensitive to the inclusion of observed and
unobserved factors proxied by demographic characteristics.
The second approach is to construct p-values using the bootstrap t-procedure (Cameron et al.,
2008). With a small number of clusters, the cluster-robust standard errors might be downward
biased, this in turn can cause over-rejection of the no-effect null hypothesis. Thusly, we conduct
the bootstrap t-procedure with 999 replications and present the bootstrapped p-value in Table 3.4.
As shown, there are no meaningful changes in the statistical significance of the results.
3.7.2 Placebo Experiments
If our major results are affected by external changes other than AC 21, then significant changes
may be expected even before the actual adoption of AC 21. To rule out this possibility, we check
if the DID estimates are significant to a randomly assigned treatment year before the adoption of
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Table 3.4: Inference for Treatment Effect of AC 21: Wild Bootstrap-t Procedure
Linear Difference in Difference Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Academia Academia Academia Academia Industry Industry Industry Industry
Parameter estimates 0.047*** 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.047*** -0.054*** -0.047*** -0.041*** -0.038***
P-value
Cluster-robust 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Wild cluster bootstrap-t 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.008
Year and Major Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field-Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Major-Specific Linear Time Trends No No No Yes No No No Yes
Demographic Variables No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Each cell indicates a separate regression. The dependent variable is whether individual response to place in industry (for the first four columns) and academia (for
the second four columns) at the time of answering the questionnaire. The explanatory variable of interest refers to noncitizen Ph.Ds who graduated after the adoption
of AC 21. Data is restricted to doctorate recipients who have determined plan for employment and intend to stay in the US in the immediate following year. Field-Year
fixed effect controls for 385 doctoral majors. Standard errors are clustered on fourteen broadly classified doctorate fields and we perform wild cluster bootstrap-t test
with 999 replications, following an example in Cameron et al. (2008).
35
AC 21. Specifically, we conduct several placebo exercises to compare the outcome differences
in the treatment and comparison groups over different designs of pre- and post-treatment year
arrangements.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 3.5 show the results of placebo tests over different specifications
for academic job preference. Columns (5) to (8) display the equivalent estimation for industry job
choice. Each row represents a different pre/post arrangement scenario. For example, the first row
assigns the placebo intervention year to 1995. Across the estimation scenarios and specifications,
nearly all of the estimates indicate no effect. It is noteworthy to detect no significant effects in the
placebo tests given the large sample size of the dataset used in this study.
3.7.3 Falsification Test
The identification of the Difference-in-Difference strategy is based on two key assumptions.
The first assumption is the parallel trend assumption for foreign-born and U.S. domestic gradu-
ates. Namely, without the policy intervention, the treatment and comparison group would have
undertaken the same time trend over time. We checked the first assumption qualitatively and quan-
titatively in previous sections and presented the results in Figures 3.1 to 3.4. The other assumption
states that except for the exogenous shock generated from the policy intervention, other external
variations are assumed to be orthogonal to the outcome of interest after effectively controlling for
observable differences.
In this section, we will test this second assumption. Constructing a test for the second as-
sumption in our study is equivalent to checking whether Ph.D graduates who are exogenous to this
policy intervention also change their job type preference after its implementation.
Foreign-born Ph.D graduates who are trained as post-doctoral scholars are not required to
change their visa status from a F1 student visa to a H-1B work visa. Throughout the duration
of the Optional Practical Training (OPT), foreign Ph.D holders can acquire post-doctoral training
under the same student visa status. Therefore, individuals seeking a post-doctoral position are
not affected by the AC 21 policy change. There are no additional incentives inducing would-be-
postdocs to change their plan towards employment in academia. Moreover, foreign Ph.Ds who are
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Table 3.5: Placebo Effect on Job Placement in Academia and Industry in Pre-periods, Linear DID Estimation
Placebo intervention happened at: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Academia Academia Academia Academia Industry Industry Industry Industry
1995 -0.023 -0.016 -0.019 -0.018 0.026 0.021 0.022 0.022
(0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021)
1996 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.019
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
1997 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.006 -0.000 0.003 0.006 0.006
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
1998 0.019* 0.017* 0.012* 0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.004 -0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
1999 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.009 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009)
Observations 89188 89188 87187 87187 89188 89188 87187 87187
Year and Major Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field-Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Major-Specific Linear Time Trends No No No Yes No No No Yes
Demographic Variables No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Each cell indicates a separate regression. Suppose treatment happened in 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 or 1999, we test whether there is significant jump even
before the actual AC 21 (enacted at the end of 2000) took into effect. For instance, we set pre-period from 1995 to 1997, post-period from 1998 to 2000 for
placebo intervention supposed to happen at the end of 1997.
The dependent variable is whether individual response to place in academia at the time of answering the questionnaire. The explanatory variable of interest refers
to noncitizen Ph.Ds who graduated after the adoption of AC 21. Data is restricted to doctorate recipients who have determined plan for employment and intend to
stay in the US in the immediate following year. Field-Year fixed effect controls for 385 doctoral majors. Robust standard errors are clustered at fourteen broadly
classified doctoral fields.
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qualified for a high standard faculty position would normally not be influenced by this visa policy
to take a post-doctoral position instead of a full-time faculty opportunity. It is also reasonable to
assume that a foreign doctorate holder with a permanent job offer in industry would not be driven
by AC 21 to favor a post-doctoral position. Essentially, AC 21 only affects the job preference of
individuals with job prospects subject to the regulation of the H-1B policy. Due to this feature,
AC 21 would not have a significant impact on the aggregate participation level of post-doctoral
scholars. In order to exclude other external events taking place around the same time of AC 21
driving the results in Section 3.6, analogous estimations for post-doctoral scholars, unaffected by
the AC 21, are implemented in this section and they should yield null effects.
According to this line of reasoning, we perform similar estimations to post-doctoral participa-
tion. Table 3.6 presents the point estimates for our main specifications using DID linear probability
and DID probit models. Across columns (1) to (4), we gradually augment our specifications to al-
low for idiosyncratic shocks by academic fields over time, each doctoral major to follow their own
time trend and controlling for individual level characteristics. Overall, the sign of the parameters
are unstable and there are no statistically significant effects of AC 21 on post-doctoral participa-
tion. As the data source used for the analysis is the census of the entire population, this falsification
tests provides convincing support to our main findings and rule out other factors driving the effects
identified in Section 3.6.
It is possible that the post-doctoral job market participation may be stable enough to remain
unaffected by most exogenous variations. If this is the case, the detected orthogonality of post-
doctoral participation to AC 21 might not provide sufficient evidence about the exclusion of other
possible influencing shocks. However, a report from the National Science Foundation (NSF),
estimated that the number of post-doctoral researchers had almost doubled from 1987 to 2002
(Thurgood, 2004). Lan (2012) documents a 24% decrease in post-doctoral participation among
Chinese graduates in response to an unexpected increase of the permanent visa granting due to the
Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992. Stephan and Ma (2005) employed the same data set used
in our study to examine the underlying factors for the rise of post-doctoral participation. All these
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Table 3.6: Falsification Tests: The Effect of AC 21 on Postdoctoral Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable
A. Linear Difference in Difference Estimation
Noncitizen Ph.Ds Graduated after AC 21 0.009 -0.002 -0.003 0.002
(0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 264636 264636 258042 258042
B. Probit Difference in Difference Estimation
-0.002 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 264518 264518 257771 257771
Year and Major Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field-Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Major-Specific Linear Time Trends No No No Yes
Demographic Variables No No Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Each cell indicates a separate regression. The dependent variable is whether individual re-
sponse to postdoc participation after graduation. The explanatory variable of interest refers to nonci-
tizen Ph.Ds who graduated after the adoption of AC 21. Data is restricted to doctorate recipients who
have definite plan for study or employment and intend to stay in the US in the immediate follow-
ing year. Field-Year fixed effect controls for 385 regular doctoral fields. Robust standard errors are
clustered at fourteen broadly classified doctoral fields.
studies provide support to the notion that the unresponsiveness of post-doctoral participation to AC
21 is driven by its orthogonality to the policy change.
3.8 Heterogeneous Effects by Doctoral Field
In this section we investigate whether AC 21 affects foreign Ph.Ds asymmetrically by academic
field. As shown in Table 3.1 domestic and foreign-born doctoral recipients diverge in their pref-
erences for academic fields. For instance, foreign Ph.D students are more likely to select STEM
related majors compared to domestic students. In order to account for this potential selection, we
control for detailed major fixed effects and allow for different majors to follow their own linear
trend in our aggregate estimation presented in previous sections. Since the supply and demand of
the job market conditions for different fields naturally differs, an individual field examination will
provide an indication of where the exact treatment effect comes from. Therefore, an investigation
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on the potential heterogeneous responses of job choices to AC 21 by academic field is needed.
Meanwhile, we argue that the exogenous shock from AC 21 is independent of the field selection
of foreign-born Ph.Ds. Considering the strong requirements and specialized information required
by doctoral programs, it is unlikely that foreign Ph.Ds would strategically change their fields in
response to AC 21. Furthermore, our post-period includes six years after AC 21, covering the full
length of most doctoral programs. Most Ph.D cohorts who registered after the full implementation
of this policy intervention would also officially graduate after 2006, and these cohorts are already
excluded from our data.
We stratify the sample to fourteen broadly classified doctoral fields as defined in Table 3.1,
except for the last category “Fields Not Classified Elsewhere”. The point estimates for all the other
thirteen categories are presented in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. Equation 3.1 is implemented in our DID
specification with linear probability and probit models. The heterogeneity in the estimates suggests
that our aggregate estimate of career preference in academia is largely driven by Ph.D graduates
majoring in Agriculture and Life Science (AGLS), Mathematics and Business Management (BM).
The point estimates for these fields are about twice as large as the estimates for Biological Sci-
ence and Computer Science (CS), and more than three times than that for Engineering and Social
Science. Specifically, the point estimate for Computer Science is 59% of that for AGLS in the
linear probability model and 53% of that for AGLS in the probit model. The estimated treatment
effect for Engineering is even lower, assuming 21% of the point estimate for AGLS in the linear
model and 28% of that for AGLS in the probit model . The responses of other fields such as Health
Sciences, Physical Sciences and Psychology to AC 21 are positive for choosing academia, but the
effects are not statistically significant.
For industry jobs shown in Table 3.8, the heterogeneity in career preferences are mainly driven
by AGLS, CS and BM. Overall, we observe more variation in the significance of point estimates for
career choices in industry. For instance, Mathematics is only marginally affected by this policy in
both models and the parameter significance level for CS decreases to 5% in the linear model. This
is consistent with our previous aggregate results in Section 3.6.1 and might be plausibly explained
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Table 3.7: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of AC 21 on Job Placement in Academia, By Doctorate Field
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
A. Linear Difference in Difference Estimation
Noncitizen Ph.Ds Graduated after AC 21 0.145*** 0.052** 0.025 0.031*** 0.086*** 0.120*** -0.014 0.046 0.036** -0.022 -0.013 0.091*** -0.010
(0.037) (0.022) (0.019) (0.011) (0.006) (0.030) (0.014) (0.076) (0.013) (0.016) (0.033) (0.026) (0.026)
Observations 3417 7903 7357 23462 4943 4188 10790 13188 17161 25732 41297 7196 2508
B. Probit Difference in Difference Estimation
0.196*** 0.063** 0.032* 0.054*** 0.104*** 0.118*** 0.001 0.048 0.035** -0.025 -0.007 0.085*** -0.003
(0.044) (0.026) (0.018) (0.009) (0.003) (0.029) (0.021) (0.083) (0.015) (0.025) (0.044) (0.021) (0.027)
Observations 3417 7902 7357 23460 4943 4188 10790 13188 17161 25714 41297 7196 2508
Year and Major Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Major-Specific Linear Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Each cell indicates a separate regression. The dependent variable is whether individual response to place in academia at the time of answering the questionnaire. The explanatory variable of interest refers to
noncitizen Ph.Ds who graduated after the adoption of AC 21. Data is restricted to doctorate recipients who have determined plan for employment and intend to stay in the US in the immediate following year. Robust
standard errors are clustered at doctorate majors.
Doctoral field corresponding to each column is as the following:
(1) Agriculture and Life Science; (2) Biological/Biomedical Sciences; (3) Health Sciences; (4) Engineering; (5) Computer and Information Sciences; (6) Mathematics; (7) Physical Sciences; (8) Psychology; (9) Social
Sciences; (10) Humanities; (11) Education; (12) Business Management; (13) Communication.
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Table 3.8: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of AC 21 on Job Placement in Industry, By Doctorate Field
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
A. Linear Difference in Difference Estimation
Noncitizen Ph.Ds Graduated after AC 21 -0.068** 0.012 -0.005 -0.005 -0.096** -0.072* 0.025* -0.097* -0.017 -0.006 -0.003 -0.083*** 0.010
(0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.012) (0.014) (0.036) (0.013) (0.053) (0.011) (0.009) (0.017) (0.026) (0.023)
Observations 3417 7903 7357 23462 4943 4188 10790 13188 17161 25732 41297 7196 2508
B. Probit Difference in Difference Estimation
-0.072*** 0.011 0.003 -0.041*** -0.108*** -0.053* 0.021 -0.065* -0.003 -0.013* 0.001 -0.054*** 0.010
(0.018) (0.027) (0.021) (0.013) (0.010) (0.028) (0.017) (0.028) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.022)
Observations 3417 7902 7357 23460 4943 4188 10790 13170 17161 25431 41297 7196 2499
Year and Major Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Major-Specific Linear Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: Each cell indicates a separate regression. The dependent variable is whether individual response to place in industry at the time of answering the questionnaire. The explanatory variable of interest refers to noncitizen
Ph.Ds who graduated after the adoption of AC 21. Data is restricted to doctorate recipients who have determined plan for employment and intend to stay in the US in the immediate following year. Robust standard errors
are clustered at doctorate majors.
Doctoral field corresponding to each column is as the following:
(1) Agriculture and Life Science; (2) Biological/Biomedical Sciences; (3) Health Sciences; (4) Engineering; (5) Computer and Information Sciences; (6) Mathematics; (7) Physical Sciences; (8) Psychology; (9) Social
Sciences; (10) Humanities; (11) Education; (12) Business Management; (13) Communication.
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by the fact that the provisions of AC 21 only impose an indirect effect on industry job choices.
3.9 Concluding Remarks
The prevalent debate surrounding immigration policy has attracted much attention. One key is-
sue often discussed is whether high-skilled immigrants have a complementary or displacing effect
on domestic workers. A crucial challenge for detecting this effect relies on overcoming the endo-
geneity of the behavior of immigrants in the job market. An evaluation of how immigration policy
change influences job market preferences of high-skilled immigrants paves the way to accurately
identify the impact of foreign workers on domestic workers in the future. In this study, we lever-
age the H-1B policy shock generated by the AC 21 as an exogenous variation and capture changes
in job choices of foreign Ph.D graduates in academia and industry. AC 21 eliminates the cap on
the number of H-1B visas to be granted for applicants in universities, non-profit and government
research institutions.
Our findings indicate that by reducing the potential risk in the process of the H-1B petition, AC
21 on average causes foreign Ph.D graduates to be 5% more likely to start a career in academia and
indirectly causes them to be 3-4% less likely to begin a career in industry. Our point estimates for
the direct treatment effect are robust to the inclusion of various controls including individual level
characteristics, differing trends in majors and idiosyncratic shocks on academic fields over time,
while the indirect effect is subject to slight sensitivity to the specifications. A falsification test on
post-doctoral participation and placebo experiments based on pre-period data further support the
estimated results, excluding other possible external changes in the labor market. Heterogeneous
examinations indicate that the academic major treatment effect is driven by Ph.D recipients in
Agriculture and Life Science, Mathematics and Business Management.
We present evidence that eliminating the H-1B visa cap for research institutions makes newly
foreign Ph.Ds more likely to stay in academia in the United States. Meanwhile, these estimated
results do not take into consideration the potential growth among foreign Ph.Ds to work in non-
profit/government research institutions. To the extent that Ph.D recipients are driven to seek em-
ployment in these institutions, our estimated effects will understate the potential impact on aca-
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demic labor markets.
One notable pattern for our results is that the effects from AC 21 phased out eventually as the
Great Recession approached. From the perspective of demand side, as all cap-exempt institutions
are non-profit entities, it is plausible that these institutions were not able to fully digest the in-
creased supply of noncitizen Ph.D generated from this policy. Besides the AC 21, there is also a
lack of follow-up favoring policies facilitating qualified institutions to boost the demand for nonci-
tizen doctoral recipients. This unbalance was further intensified as the Great Recession finally
commenced and we see a trend of career preference back to its previous levels after five years of
the adoption of AC 21.
Our findings have critical policy implications. We argue that the accumulated effect from this
exogenous variation could be even larger. As identified by previous studies, the influx of high-
skilled immigrants, particularly Ph.D holders, makes great contributions to the number of patents
filed and the development of fundamental research across academic fields. Admittedly, in the
field of scientific research, sometimes contributions from several key figures could bring ground-
breaking reform to a discipline. Therefore, the long-term effect from this temporary increase in
the supply of doctorate recipients, of all academic fields of study, to the research institutions is
also worth examining. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, we were not able to exploit it in this
study. In order to understand the full impact of AC 21, future studies can also investigate its effects
on wages in high-skilled labor markets.
44
4. IDENTIFYING MISCLASSIFICATION ERRORS IN SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING: A
NEW APPROACH TO MAP HAPPINESS
“Happiness is the meaning and purpose of life, the whole aim and end of human exis-
tence.”
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, book 1, section 7.
4.1 Introduction
The pursuit of happiness has been paramount for humankind throughout history. It has evoked
the attention of philosophers from Epicurus and Aristotle to Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart
Mill. The U.S. constitution declares that the pursuit of happiness is an unalienable right of every
individual. But what is happiness? And how can it be measured? A recent and growing literature
argues that income and consumption are not ideal measures of well-being (see Fleurbaey (2009)
for a review). Subjective well-being (SWB) can arguably be used as a standard for measuring
social welfare and progress. The contemporary literature related to the economics of happiness
started with the pioneering work of Richard Easterlin (1974). Recently, SWB is gaining attention
in economic research and welfare evaluation.
The most frequently used method to elicit SWB is to directly ask people about their feelings
of happiness and overall life satisfaction (e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2000, 2002, 2010; Diener, 2000).
This method is attractive due to its simplicity and versatility. However, compared to objective
indicators of social welfare, SWB is subject to substantial misreporting or measurement errors.
Self-reported measures of happiness can be largely disturbed by contextual factors, and personal
reasons such as selective memory and projection bias. Furthermore, people may avoid reporting
extreme categories of SWB, deceiving themselves to believe that they are more (or less) happy
than they actually are (e.g., Hagedorn, 1996; Sheridan et al., 2015). Individuals may also be easily
influenced by random shocks of recent events at the time of responding to surveys due to projection
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bias (Chetty, 2015). For example, dealing with health problems or the loss of a close relative may
negatively impact happiness measures. On the contrary, a recent job promotion or the birth of a
child may positively influence self-reported happiness. More importantly, it is difficult for some
people to precisely evaluate their subjective well-being. Using a hypothetical survey of SWB
rankings under different scenarios, Benjamin et al. (2012) find systematic reversals in individual
choices of reported happiness. Although there is evidence of measurement errors in self-reported
happiness (OECD, 2013; Diener et al., 2013; Chetty, 2015), this issue has been mostly ignored
by empirical practitioners. Since precise and reliable measurements of SWB are fundamental for
understanding the economics of happiness, we believe that it is critical to explore ways to recover
the true latent status of SWB.
To address this concern, we apply a novel closed-form identification and estimation method
first proposed by Hu (2008) and developed in Feng and Hu (2013). In general, the methodology
employs an eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition technique to establish a closed-form identifica-
tion for the misclassification matrix of SWB, which is constructed a priori using the conditional
distribution of reported happiness. By pre-multiplying the inverse of the identified misclassifi-
cation matrix by the unconditional distribution of SWB, the underlying true distribution of latent
SWB is directly estimated. This method is becoming popular in recent empirical applications (e.g.,
An et al., 2010, 2017). The identification strategy in our article is implemented in the spirit of Feng
and Hu (2013).
The data source that we employ to recover the true underlying distribution of latent SWB is the
Integrated European/World Value Survey (EVS/WVS). EVS and WVS have been widely used in
economic research (e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008b; Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015;
Stevenson and Wolfers, 2013; Alesina and Giuliano, 2010; Galor and Özaka, 2016). Besides its
broad use, we use these data because it contains three direct measures of SWB across countries
and time, which are required for identification.1 For sake of computation, we select 80 countries
based on geographical diversity and consistency of survey data across periods.
1Other data sources for SWB include: World Happiness Report, Pew Global Attitudes Survey, Gallup World Poll
and the International Social Survey Programme.
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We use reported “feeling of happiness” in EVS/WVS as the direct measurement of SWB, while
“life satisfaction” (LS) and “freedom of choice and control in life” (FCC) serve as two repeated
measures of SWB.2 Under relatively weak assumptions, we impose a structure on the misclassi-
fication of reported happiness and are able to obtain the latent SWB probability distributions by
country and demographic groups. Based on these results, we exploit country characteristics and
specific demographic groups to explain misclassification errors. Particularly, we examine how the
prevalent religion of a country affects the magnitude and direction of the bias in self-reported hap-
piness. The relationship between religion and SWB has been abundantly discussed (e.g., Ellison,
1994; Dolan et al., 2008; Deaton and Stone, 2013; Argyle, 2003; Francis, 2010; Campante and
Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015). In this article, we add to the literature by examining this association
through the lens of identifying misclassification errors in SWB.
Another motivation of our study is related to the well-known “Easterlin paradox” (e.g., East-
erlin, 1974, 1995; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004); See Kahneman and Krueger (2006); Frey
and Stutzer (2002); Clark et al. (2008) for a more comprehensive review. The Easterlin para-
dox posits that although there is a positive correlation between individual income and measures
of SWB, aggregate happiness is not significantly associated with GDP per capita. Recent studies
have challenged the validity of the Easterlin paradox and argue that there is robust evidence of a
positive relationship between SWB and income across countries and over time (e.g., Hagerty and
Veenhoven, 2003; Deaton, 2008; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008a; Sacks et al., 2010; Stevenson and
Wolfers, 2013).
Meanwhile, a modified version of the Easterlin’s hypothesis has also been proposed. It argues
that the correlation between income and SWB only exists for individuals with income below a
certain threshold, beyond which income is no longer related to happiness (e.g., Frey and Stutzer,
2002; Clark et al., 2008; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2008; Di Tella et al., 2010). For instance, Clark
et al. (2008) state that “greater economic prosperity at some point ceases to buy more happiness.”
The debate about the Easterlin paradox and its modified hypothesis is likely to continue unless
2A detailed explanation for the choice of variables is presented in Section 2.3.
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SWB can be more precisely measured and quantified.
Our study makes the first attempt to use a sophisticated method to correct misclassification er-
rors in self-reported SWB. Our analysis produced the following major findings. First, self-reported
happiness elicited from surveys has substantial misclassification errors. Second, misclassification
errors of SWB are heterogeneous across countries with different prevalent religious beliefs. Third,
our analysis shows that religious beliefs and economic development impact how misclassifica-
tion errors relate to demographic characteristics. Lastly, we use the corrected SWB obtained by
our latent variable approach to reexamine the Easterlin paradox and modified-Easterlin hypothe-
sis. Although reported measures of SWB provide support for the Easterlin hypothesis, using our
corrected measures of SWB lead to reject the original and modified Easterlin hypotheses.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 documents the data. Section 3 introduces
the identification strategy. Section 4 reports the results, and section 5 concludes. A complete proof
for the theorem presented in section 3 is reported in the Appendix. Summary statistics of the data
and other detailed subsidiary results are presented in the supplementary materials.
4.2 Data
The main data source for this study is the Integrated European/World Value Survey (EVS/ WVS
hereafter) from 1981 to 2014. There are four waves in EVS and six waves in WVS, providing a
wide coverage of countries around the world.3 The two surveys do not define the years and waves in
exactly the same way. For a particular country, the data appears in either the EVS or WVS survey,
and for most countries, data were not continuously collected across waves. As a result, the country
level data are unbalanced across years. Previous studies, such as Stevenson and Wolfers (2013),
employ cross sectional analysis by wave. The potential concern with this method is that each
estimation includes different countries. We attempt to make cross country comparisons feasible
by pooling available data from all waves by country and identifying the true latent SWB for each
3The four waves of EVS data are from 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001 as well as 2008-2010, and the six waves
of WVS data are from 1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014. A list of countries and
waves is provided in the supplementary material.
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demographic group countrywide.4
The three key variables selected as the measures for subjective well-being come from 1) level
of happiness, 2) overall life satisfaction (LS) and 3) freedom of choice and control in life (FCC).
The “happiness” variable is the directly reported measure of SWB (Helliwell et al., 2012; OECD,
2013). We use LS as another close measurement of SWB, as suggested by previous literature
(OECD, 2013). FCC is chosen as the third measurement of SWB for identification purposes,
which will be further elaborated in the next section.
Since the three SWB questions use different scales, to identify the latent status of SWB, we
recoded them to guarantee all three variables of interest share a common support. The variables
are defined as follows: 1) Happiness has three levels: “unhappy”, “quite happy” and “very happy”;
2) overall life satisfaction can be: “most dissatisfied”,“quite satisfied” and “most satisfied”; 3)
freedom of choice and control can be: “not at all”, “quite a bit” and “ a great deal”. The overall
distributions of the three variables are similar, with around 14-19% of the observations in the first
category, 51-57% in the second category, and 23-27% in the third category.
In addition to demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, family income) provided in the
EVS/WVS dataset, country-level characteristics are also used in the analysis. GDP per capita was
obtained from the Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2015). The World Factbook was used to
identify the prevalent religion of each country.
4.3 Nonparametric Identification
In order to correct potential under/over-reporting in each category of self-reported subjective
well-being, we apply a recently proposed closed-form identification and estimation method in the
spirit of Feng and Hu (2013) and Hu (2008) to recover an individual’s latent true classification of
SWB. Note that Hu (2008) sets up a 2-measurement model of the latent variable, while Feng and
Hu (2013) develop a 3-measurement model of the latent variable. Given our data structure, we
4Notice that our strategy of identifying only one set of latent SWB status for each country-demographic group
combination leveraging all available data over time makes it possible to do cross-country comparisons; however, this
strategy also makes our results not compatible with other studies using cross-sectional data wave by wave or panel
data from other sources.
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employ a 3-measurement model to identify the underlying SWB.
4.3.1 Basic Set-up and Assumptions
Let X be the reported status of SWB, and X∗ be the underlying true status of SWB. We use
the reported status of happiness in the EVS/WVS as the direct measurement of SWB, X . Y and
Z represent two other indirect measurements of SWB. Y and Z were obtained from responses
to questions related to life satisfaction (LS) and freedom of choice and control in life (FCC). We
further control for several sociodemographic factors including age, gender and income, which in a
simple OLS regression contribute significantly to direct measurements of SWB. Identification sub-
samples are defined based on individual characteristics, represented in the model asC. We observe
an i.i.d. set {X, Y, Z,C}i, where i = 1, ..., N . The three categories for each SWB measurement
variable are listed below:
X =

1 Unhappy
2 Quite Happy
3 Very Happy
 , Y =

1 Most Dissatisfied
2 Quite Satisfied
3 Most Satisfied
 , Z =

1 Not At All
2 Quite A Bit
3 A Great Deal

Next, we define the misclassification probabilities and distributions for the latent SWB status in
matrix form. For each demographic group c, one realization of the combination of the three indi-
vidual characteristics, the misclassification matrix is defined as:
HX|X∗,c ≡ [Pr(X = i|X∗ = k, c)]i,k (4.1)
The diagonal matrix is defined as:
HY=3|X∗,c ≡ [Pr(Y = 3|X∗ = k, c)]k (4.2)
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Similarly, other distribution matrices are defined as:
HY=3,X,Z|c ≡ [Pr(Y = 3, X, Z|c)]i,k (4.3)
HX,Z|c ≡ [Pr(X,Z|c)]i,k (4.4)
HX∗,Z|c ≡ [Pr(X∗, Z|c)]i,k (4.5)
The assumptions required for identification of the underlying true SWB status are provided below.
Assumption 1. Pr(X|X∗, Z, c) = Pr(X|X∗, c)
This assumption implies that conditional on the true SWB status and individual characteristics,
the reported status does not rely on other measurements of SWB. The Z measure is only allowed to
correlate with misclassification errors through the latent true SWB status. The difference between
the latent X∗ and X is assumed to be independent with respect to other measures represented by
Z.
Assumption 2. Pr(Y |X∗, X, Z, c) = Pr(Y |X∗, c)
Similarly to Assumption 1, Assumption 2 indicates that reported SWB (X) and the measure
of Z affect the probability distribution of reported LS only through the latent true SWB status;
X or Z does not contain additional useful information on reported LS beyond the true SWB and
individual characteristics c. Note that Feng and Hu (2013), by the first-order Markov restriction,
essentially assume that Pr(Y ∗|X∗, Z∗, c) = Pr(Y ∗|X∗, c). In our case we impose Assumption 2
following Hu (2008).
Assumption 3. Full rank condition: Rank(HX,Z|c) = 3.
We quantitatively test the rank condition using the method proposed by Robin and Smith
(2000). The full rank of HX,Z|c is tested in a sequential procedure. Specifically, we first test
the null hypothesis of rank 1 against rank 2, and then rank 2 against rank 3. The results of the rank
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test are presented in the supplementary materials. In our setting, to leverage the potential variation
between FCC and SWB, FCC was chosen as Z. 5.
Assumption 4. Pr(Y = 3|X∗ = i, c) 6= Pr(Y = 3|X∗ = j, c) for all i 6= j.
Assumption 5. Given the measure of Y and individual characteristics c, the conditional proba-
bility Pr(Y = 3|X∗, c) is strictly increasing in X∗.
Assumption 3 guarantees the invertibility of HX,Z|c, and Assumption 4 indicates the three
elements in the diagonal matrix HY=3|X∗,c are different. Assumption 5 is equivalent to assuming
that when LS status is observed in level 3 (most satisfied with life), it is more likely that individuals
make their judgement based on their latent SWB of level 3 as well. Similarly, it is less likely that
a self-reported level of 3 in LS is based on a lower underlying SWB (i.e., level 1 or 2).
4.3.2 Estimation Procedures
The identification procedure for latent SWB is constructive. The misclassification matrix will
be directly estimated by the following steps. First, by the law of total probability and stated as-
sumptions, the following relationships are satisfied:
Pr(Y,X,Z|c) = ∑X∗ Pr(Y |X∗, c)Pr(X|X∗, c)Pr(X∗, Z|c) (4.6)
Pr(X,Z|c) = ∑X∗ Pr(X|X∗, c)Pr(X∗, Z|c) (4.7)
In matrix form, we have
HY=3,X,Z|c = HX|X∗,cHY=3|X∗,cHX∗,Z|c (4.8)
HX,Z|c = HX|X∗,cHX∗,Z|c (4.9)
HY=3,X,Z|cHX,Z|c−1 = HX|X∗,cHY=3|X∗,cHX|X∗,c−1 (4.10)
5Theoretically, the three measurements can be used interchangeably. Empirically, we choose FCC to be the third
measurement of SWB as it serves the purpose of measuring SWB, but it also causes variation in the joint distribution
of X and Z by each level of Z to the extent thatHX,Z|c has the best chance to exist. Namely, if X and Z are identical,
Z does not provide any additional information on their joint distribution; and each column ofHX,Z|c is expressed in
the other two columns, then the inverse ofHX,Z|c will not exist.
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The last equation indicates that the left-hand side has an eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition on
the right hand side. The left hand side is obtained from the survey responses. Accordingly, the
misclassification matrix HX|X∗,c is directly estimated through eigen-decomposition.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1 through 5, the misclassification matrixHX|X∗,c is nonparamet-
rically identified and directly estimated through the unique eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition
of equation 10.
This result is obtained following Theorem 1 in Hu (2008); See a complete proof in Section S2
of the Supplement. In the second step, the distribution of the underlying true status is recovered
by multiplying the inverse matrix of HX|X∗,c by the self-reported SWB vector. Reversibility is
guaranteed by the property of eigen-vectors. Since self-reported status is directly observed in the
survey data, the distribution vector of the true latent SWB is obtained by:

Pr(X∗ = 1|c)
Pr(X∗ = 2|c)
Pr(X∗ = 3|c)
 = HX|X
∗,c
−1

Pr(X = 1|c)
Pr(X = 2|c)
Pr(X = 3|c)
 (4.11)
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Reported versus Corrected Happiness
In total, our sample covers 80 countries around the world.6 Figure 4.1 presents a map of
the average reported (Panel a) and corrected (Panel b) happiness for all 80 countries. A larger
numerical value represents a higher level of happiness.
6The list of countries is provided in Table S2 of the supplementary material. There are at most 18 demographic
groups in each country, i.e., full factorial of two genders, three age groups, and three income groups. Due to sample
size limitations for certain countries, not all demographic groups within those countries were identified. Following the
assumptions of Section 2.3, over 18 demographic groups, 24 countries are fully identified, 18 countries are identified
for 17 demographic groups, 25 countries are identified for 16 demographic groups, 9 countries are identified for 15
demographic groups and 2 countries are identified for 14 demographic groups. Binomial tests for the hypothesis that
each identified group is chosen with equal probability (1/18) can not be rejected for all 18 demographic subsamples;
see the supplementary material for more details.
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This variable is obtained as the summation of happiness measures weighted by the proportion
of reported or corrected happiness at each level. Specifically, the observed proportion of people
in country i who report being “unhappy”, “quite happy” and “very happy” are defined by the
vector {ω1i, ω2i, ω3i}. Using the constructive identification procedures described in the previous
section, the underlying latent distribution for the three levels of SWB is represented by the vector
{ω∗1i, ω∗2i, ω∗3i}.
Reported Happiness = 1 ∗ ω1i + 2 ∗ ω2i + 3 ∗ ω3i (4.12)
Corrected Happiness = 1 ∗ ω∗1i + 2 ∗ ω∗2i + 3 ∗ ω∗3i (4.13)
By comparing panels (a) and (b), we find that while nations such as Russia, China and Brazil do
not appear to have sizable differences between reported and corrected levels of happiness, other
countries show pronounced differences (e.g., Japan, United States).
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(1.9,2]
(2,2.1]
(2.1,2.2]
(2.2,2.5]
No data
(a) Reported Happiness
[1.5,1.8]
(1.8,1.9]
(1.9,2]
(2,2.1]
(2.1,2.2]
(2.2,2.5]
No data
(b) Corrected Happiness
Figure 4.1: World Map: Reported vs. Corrected Happiness
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The difference between reported and corrected SWB at each level of happiness can be either
positive or negative, (i.e., over-reporting or under-reporting the true happiness status).7 Simply
comparing the aggregate levels of SWB fails to account for the direction of the misclassification
errors. In order to further explore discrepancies between reported and corrected happiness, we also
calculate misclassification errors taking into account the direction of correction and the distance
between the two vectors. Specifically, we utilize the potential error at each level of happiness to
construct misclassification errors of SWB for each country. We define Level 1 bias as ω1i − ω∗1i
and Level 3 bias as ω3i−ω∗3i, which represent the biases in reporting “unhappy” and “very happy”
categories, respectively. These two measures are further examined since they are more informative
about the direction of misclassification errors of individual SWB. A positive Level 3 (Level 1)
bias implies a significant proportion of people reporting more extreme feelings of happiness than
they really are; i.e., reporting “very happy” (“unhappy”), while actually being “quite happy”. In
contrast, a negative Level 3 (Level 1) bias suggests that people are inclined to suppress extreme
categories. For instance, an individual may overstate happiness due to self-deception, while others
may understate SWB. In another example, as the “Doctrine of the Mean” is highly praised in
Asian Confucian culture,8 citizens in Confucian countries may be more likely to report being
“quite happy” and avoid extreme categories.
Figure 4.2 summarizes Level 1 and Level 3 biases across countries. Many countries have
substantial bias at both levels. Misclassification errors in countries such as the United States and
Canada come mainly from Level 1 bias. E.g., American and Canadian respondents tend to avoid
reporting that they are “unhappy”. It is also observed that China, Hong Kong and Germany have
a negative bias at both levels simultaneously. Note that countries that have negative biases at both
levels are not only restricted to confucian or Asian countries. Also, some countries present positive
7We use “over-report”, hereafter, if reported SWB (by level) is larger than corrected SWB (by level); and we
use “under-report”, hereafter, if reported SWB (by level) is smaller than corrected SWB (by level). We define “up-
ward (downward) shifting”, hereafter, in situations where the SWB status is reported upward (downward) from the
underlying true status of SWB.
8As interpreted by James Legge in The Sacred Books of China, the principle of the “Doctrine of the Mean” is to
guide the mind to a state of constant equilibrium, which recommends one should never act in excess. James Legge
was a Scottish sinologist, missionary, and scholar, best known as an early translator of Classical Chinese texts into
English.
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Figure 4.2: World Map: Misclassification Error of Happiness.A
Level 1 bias but negative Level 3 bias; which means they are more inclined to over-report being
“unhappy”, but under-report being “very happy”. There are nine countries with this pattern, six
of which are from eastern Europe, including Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Lithuania, Slovakia and
Macedonia. The other three countries are Colombia, Egypt, and Zimbabwe. On the other hand,
there are 38 countries with negative Level 1 and positive Level 3 biases, implying under-reporting
being “unhappy” and over-reporting being “very happy”. Out of the 38 countries sharing this
pattern, 13 countries have both Level 1 and Level 3 biases larger than 0.1 in absolute value. These
countries are Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador, India, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Puerto Rico,
Qatar, Rwanda, Singapore, Tanzania and Venezuela, most of which are located in tropical regions.
As noticed, misclassification error patterns are not specific to certain climate zones or geographical
regions. Hence, we explore to what degree other cultural factors such as major religious beliefs
and demographic composition also play a role in the direction and magnitude of Level 1 and Level
3 biases.
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Figure 4.3: World Map: Misclassification Error of Happiness.B
We represent misclassification errors in vector distance using Euclidean distance and rectilinear
distance (L1 norm). The misclassification error vectors measure the distance between reported
{ω1i, ω2i, ω3i} and corrected happiness {ω∗1i, ω∗2i, ω∗3i}. Specifically,
Euclidean distance =
∑3
j=1(ωji − ω∗ji)2 (4.14)
Rectilinear distance =
∑3
j=1 |ωji − ω∗ji| (4.15)
Figure 4.3 maps the two measurements of misclassification for Euclidean distance (panel a) and
rectilinear distance (panel b). By integrating the three happiness levels, Euclidean and rectilinear
measures display similar orderings over the 80 countries. As seen in Figure 4.3, in both cases
the countries with the smallest misclassification errors are Colombia, Russia and Moldova. The
countries with the largest errors (in both measurements) are Ecuador, Hong Kong and Indonesia.
For all other countries, the detailed orderings are slightly different for the two measures. For the
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three most populous countries in the world, both measures indicate that China has relatively small
misclassification errors, while the United States experiences sizable misclassification errors, and
India is subject to moderate errors.9
4.4.2 Determinants of Misclassification Errors in SWB
One of the main objectives of this article is to understand why some countries display substan-
tial misclassification errors of SWB while other countries do not. The next step after uncovering
the misclassification errors of SWB is to take a closer look at the relationship between country or
individual level characteristics and the magnitude of misclassification errors of SWB.
4.4.2.1 Correlation with Country-level Characteristics
We start by conducting a regression on the association between misclassification errors and
country-level characteristics. Then, we examine the correlation between misclassification errors
and demographic characteristics while controlling for country fixed effects.
The results from regressing various measures of misclassification errors on the log of GDP per
capita and religious beliefs are shown in Table 4.1. The first row suggests that none of the measure-
ments of misclassification errors are correlated with the log of GDP per capita. In the following
rows of Table 4.1, we examine the correlation between misclassification errors and prevalent re-
ligious beliefs. In columns 2 and 4, the outcome variables are misclassification errors measured
in vector Euclidean and rectilinear distance. Confucian countries show larger errors compared to
other countries.
In order to explore the direction of bias, columns 6 and 8 implement analogous estimations
with the outcome variables focusing on Level 1 and Level 3 biases of the reported SWB. Point
estimates for Level 1 bias suggest that compared to predominantly Christian countries, which
are the majority in our sample, “unhappy" people in Confucian countries tend to report being
“quite happy". With respect to Level 3 bias, only the mixed religion category shows a statistically
significant effect. That is, for countries with multiple dominant religions, a larger proportion of
9We present the estimated misclassification errors across all 80 countries in Table S2 of the supplemental material.
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Table 4.1: Determinants of Misclassification Error of SWB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Euclidean Euclidean Rectilinear Rectilinear Level 1 Level 1 Level 3 Level 3
log of GDP per capita 0.004 0.012 -0.013 -0.017
(0.008) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013)
Christianity - - - -
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Confucian 0.086** 0.179** -0.103* 0.041
(0.033) (0.087) (0.056) (0.056)
Hinduism -0.036 -0.078 -0.014 0.088
(0.071) (0.187) (0.120) (0.121)
Mixed 0.001 0.033 0.056 0.120*
(0.042) (0.110) (0.071) (0.071)
Islam 0.023 0.062 -0.006 0.014
(0.019) (0.050) (0.032) (0.032)
Constant 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.361*** 0.366*** -0.104*** -0.130*** 0.066* 0.015
(0.022) (0.010) (0.056) (0.026) (0.036) (0.017) (0.036) (0.017)
Observations 78 79 78 79 78 79 78 79
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Mixed indicates countries with more than one major religion.
Andorra and Puerto Rico excluded due to the lack of GDP data for these two countries.
Level 1 indicates the difference between reported and corrected value in level of “Unhappy”.
Level 3 indicates the difference between reported and corrected value in level of “Very Happy”.
people who are “quite happy" report being “very happy".
4.4.2.2 Correlation with Demographic Characteristics
In order to investigate the contributors of misclassification error of SWB in a more disaggre-
gated way, we pooled data from all countries and regressed misclassification errors on individual
level characteristics (i.e., income, gender, age). The results are shown in Table 4.2.
Gender differences in misclassification errors of SWB seem to be negligible. Male respondents
have slightly larger misclassification errors measured by rectilinear distance. We do not observe
significant variations in misclassification errors by age measured by Euclidean or rectilinear dis-
tance. However, in columns 3 and 4, we observe that younger individuals are more inclined to
over-report being “very happy” and under-report being “unhappy”, compared to older individuals.
With respect to individual income, we find that low-income individuals are more likely to report
being “quite happy” when they are actually “unhappy”; and they tend to report being “very happy”
when they are in fact “quite happy”. This finding indicates an overall pattern of upward shifting
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from the true underlying SWB when low-income individuals respond to happiness surveys. In-
terestingly, relative to middle-income individuals, the high-income group shows a similar pattern
in Level 3 bias to the low-income group, but with smaller magnitude and lower significance. In
order to capture heterogenous correlations of misclassification errors of SWB and individual-level
characteristics conditional on country-level features, we split the sample by prevalent religion and
economic development stage. The results are reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 respectively.
Recall that in Table 4.1, we show that Confucianism affects the aggregate country level misclas-
sification errors. It is also possible that religion, in general, may also affect how misclassification
errors of SWB relate to gender, age and individual income. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.3, males
have a positive but small effect on misclassification errors of SWB in Confucian countries, while
in Islamic and Christian countries males are not significantly different from females. On the one
hand, with respect to Level 1 and Level 3 biases, “unhappy” men from Christian countries tend
to under-report their true underlying SWB. On the other hand, “very happy” men from Islamic
countries are more likely to report being “quite happy” or “unhappy”. We also find heterogeneous
effects by age. In line with the results for the overall sample, in predominantly Christian countries,
younger people tend to express optimistic feelings when reporting SWB, generally over-rating
their subjective well-being compared to older cohorts.
Young people from Islamic countries show a similar pattern. However, people from Confucian
countries show an opposite pattern with regards to the association between age and misclassifica-
tion errors of SWB. That is, they tend to shift their overall underlying SWB downwards.
Regarding relative income, people from countries with multiple prevalent religions show a
similar pattern. In general, low-income and high-income cohorts are more likely to report a higher
overall subjective well-being level than their true underlying status.
We further probe the correlation between misclassification errors of SWB and individual char-
acteristics conditional on the development stage of the country. Table 4.4 provides suggestive
evidence of heterogenous relationships across countries in different stages of development. Gen-
der has no effect on misclassification errors of SWB in low and middle-income countries, but
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Table 4.2: Misclassification Error of SWB, By Group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ME-Euclidean ME-rectilinear Level 1 Level 3
Male 0.024 0.039* -0.022 -0.016
(0.016) (0.023) (0.015) (0.014)
15-29 years 0.015 0.022 -0.037** 0.055***
(0.020) (0.028) (0.018) (0.017)
30-49 years 0.005 0.013 -0.015 0.010
(0.020) (0.028) (0.018) (0.017)
Income Level: Low 0.038* 0.053* -0.082*** 0.072***
(0.020) (0.029) (0.018) (0.017)
Income Level: High 0.043** 0.068** -0.092*** 0.032*
(0.020) (0.028) (0.018) (0.017)
Constant 0.248*** 0.644*** -0.045** -0.017
(0.020) (0.028) (0.018) (0.017)
Observations 1301 1301 1301 1301
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Level 1 indicates the difference between reported and corrected value in level of “Unhappy”.
Level 3 indicates the difference between reported and corrected value in level of “Very
Happy”. The reference group for age band is “50 and more years”; The reference group
for income is “middle income level”. All specifications controlled for country level fixed
effects.
males from high-income countries show higher misclassification errors in SWB measured by Eu-
clidean and rectilinear distance. In particular, in high-income countries, males tend to report being
“quite happy” or “very happy” when they are actually “unhappy”. Young people from low-income
countries tend to report a “very happy” status when their true underlying happiness status is lower.
This bias is relatively weak in middle-income countries and it is not significant in high-income
countries. Low-income individuals tend to report their true underlying SWB in an upward-biased
pattern. Moreover, the high-income group shares the same reporting pattern of SWB as the low-
income group. The coefficients are significant for both cohorts in low-income countries. In middle-
income countries, both low-income and high-income people who are actually “unhappy” tend to
report they are “quite happy” or “very happy”. Additionally, low and high-income people liv-
ing in high-income countries present larger misclassification errors measured by Euclidean and
rectilinear distance.
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Table 4.3: Misclassification Error of SWB, Different Religions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ME-Euclidean ME-rectilinear Level 1 Level 3
Confucian Countries
Male 0.109 0.155* -0.089 -0.079
(0.072) (0.093) (0.061) (0.048)
15-29 years 0.016 0.052 0.139* -0.121**
(0.090) (0.115) (0.076) (0.059)
30-49 years -0.066 -0.082 0.159** 0.002
(0.087) (0.112) (0.074) (0.057)
Income Level: Low 0.035 0.051 -0.133* 0.173***
(0.089) (0.115) (0.076) (0.059)
Income Level: High 0.009 -0.016 -0.104 0.120**
(0.088) (0.113) (0.075) (0.058)
Observations 81 81 81 81
Christian Countries
Male 0.024 0.039 -0.030* 0.008
(0.020) (0.029) (0.018) (0.016)
15-29 years -0.001 -0.002 -0.037* 0.051**
(0.024) (0.035) (0.022) (0.020)
30-49 years 0.029 0.054 -0.045** 0.012
(0.024) (0.035) (0.022) (0.020)
Income Level: Low 0.046* 0.063* -0.098*** 0.041**
(0.025) (0.036) (0.022) (0.020)
Income Level: High 0.059** 0.086** -0.098*** 0.023
(0.024) (0.035) (0.022) (0.020)
Observations 838 838 838 838
Islamic Countries
Male -0.002 -0.003 0.028 -0.062**
(0.036) (0.048) (0.030) (0.031)
15-29 years 0.037 0.044 -0.052 0.082**
(0.044) (0.059) (0.037) (0.038)
30-49 years -0.010 -0.024 0.023 -0.000
(0.044) (0.059) (0.037) (0.038)
Income Level: Low -0.014 -0.027 -0.040 0.122***
(0.044) (0.060) (0.037) (0.038)
Income Level: High 0.007 0.039 -0.080** 0.041
(0.043) (0.059) (0.037) (0.037)
Observations 315 315 315 315
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All specifications controlled for country level fixed effects.
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Table 4.4: Misclassification Error of SWB, Different Development Stages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ME-Euclidean ME-rectilinear Level 1 Level 3
Low Income Countries
Male -0.051 -0.064 0.015 -0.031
(0.033) (0.045) (0.030) (0.030)
15-29 years 0.035 0.057 -0.054 0.109***
(0.041) (0.055) (0.037) (0.037)
30-49 years 0.014 0.033 0.006 0.040
(0.040) (0.055) (0.036) (0.037)
Income Level: Low 0.069* 0.076 -0.103*** 0.167***
(0.041) (0.055) (0.037) (0.037)
Income Level: High 0.034 0.059 -0.142*** 0.112***
(0.040) (0.054) (0.036) (0.037)
Observations 334 334 334 334
Middle Income Countries
Male 0.023 0.057 -0.010 0.011
(0.029) (0.041) (0.027) (0.025)
15-29 years -0.026 -0.039 -0.029 0.051*
(0.036) (0.051) (0.033) (0.031)
30-49 years -0.016 -0.008 0.023 0.012
(0.037) (0.051) (0.034) (0.031)
Income Level: Low -0.024 -0.035 -0.069** 0.031
(0.036) (0.051) (0.034) (0.031)
Income Level: High -0.001 0.005 -0.067** -0.020
(0.036) (0.050) (0.033) (0.030)
Observations 386 386 386 386
High Income Countries
Male 0.067*** 0.086** -0.049** -0.024
(0.024) (0.036) (0.022) (0.019)
15-29 years 0.031 0.043 -0.031 0.026
(0.030) (0.044) (0.026) (0.023)
30-49 years 0.012 0.013 -0.051* -0.008
(0.030) (0.043) (0.026) (0.023)
Income Level: Low 0.060** 0.096** -0.078*** 0.044*
(0.030) (0.044) (0.026) (0.023)
Income Level: High 0.079*** 0.117*** -0.080*** 0.023
(0.030) (0.043) (0.026) (0.023)
Observations 581 581 581 581
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
All specifications controlled for country level fixed effects.
Countries ranked as lower-middle-income are integrated with low-income countries.
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4.4.3 The Easterlin Paradox
In this section, we revisit the Easterlin paradox and modified Easterlin Hypothesis by inves-
tigating the correlation between reported and corrected happiness and GDP per capita. We first
implement simple regressions of average reported and corrected happiness on the log of GDP per
capita. As shown in Table 4.5, there is no significant correlation between reported happiness and
GDP per capita. This result, based on the reported level of happiness, provides support for the
Easterlin paradox. However, the corrected measure of happiness is strongly associated with GDP
per capita, leading to reject the Easterlin hypothesis. Notably, the coefficients are only slightly
different.
Table 4.5: Easterlin Paradox, Simple Regressions
(1) (2)
Average Reported Happiness Average Corrected Happiness
log of GDP per capita 0.031 0.035**
(0.027) (0.018)
Constant 2.021*** 1.851***
(0.073) (0.047)
adj.R-squared 0.004 0.038
Observations 78 78
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Andorra and Puerto Rico are excluded due to the lack of GDP data for these two countries.
The log of per capita GDP is adjusted in 2011 in thousand of dollars.
From the scatter diagram (“Fig 1” in the original paper) of the seminal paper by Easterlin
(1974), the author indicates that the “the association between the wealth and happiness ... is not
so clear-cut”. We replicate Easterlin’s findings using reported happiness from WVS/EVS and the
log of GDP per capita instead of GNP per capita. The equivalent representations are displayed
in the two panels of the scatter plots in Figure 4.4. Similar to the original graph, panel (a) of
Figure 4.4 does not show a definitive association between SWB and wealth. However, in panel
(b) this relationship is statistically significant when corrected happiness is used to measure SWB.
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Figure 4.4: Cross-Country Analysis of Happiness and GDP per capita
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Only a minor change in the slope is observed when comparing the two fitted lines for reported and
corrected happiness.
We also test the modified-Easterlin hypothesis following Stevenson and Wolfers (2013):
Subjective Well-beingc = α + βpoor ∗ I(GDPc < k)× [log(GDPc)− log(k)] +
βrich ∗ I(GDPc ≥ k)× [log(GDPc)− log(k)] + c
whereGDPc stands for GDP per capita of country C, and k is the threshold of satiation point (e.g.,
$15,000 in Stevenson and Wolfers (2013)).
If the modified-Easterlin hypothesis holds, the equality of βrich = 0 must hold, or at least the
relationship of βrich < βpoor. However, we find strong evidence against the modified-Easterlin hy-
pothesis, as shown in Table 4.6. In columns 1 and 2 of panel A with $10,000 as the threshold, we
find that βrich > 0 ≥ βpoor, regardless of whether the dependent variable is reported happiness or
corrected happiness. The reported and corrected happiness measures are positively associated with
the log of GDP per capita for high-income countries at the 1% level of significance. Notice that
using the reported data, the estimation yields a negative SWB-GDP gradient among poor coun-
tries, and this slope coefficient is also significant as shown in column 1. However, this negative
coefficient becomes insignificant with the corrected data, suggesting that the SWB-GDP relation
is not significantly different from zero for the countries below the threshold after correcting the
misclassification errors. We further test whether this relationship is sensitive to the selected thresh-
old amount and the exact specification. The result of βrich > βpoor is robust to the variation of the
threshold to $15,000 and $20,000. These results are consistent with the findings in Stevenson and
Wolfers (2013).
It is likely that there are heterogenous correlations between GDP and SWB across countries in
different development stages. Hence, we also specify a flexible nonparametric linear spline. The
results are presented in panel b of Table 4.6 with knots set at $10,000 and $20,000. The point
estimate is similar to that in panel a and significant at the 1% level. Although there is a reduction
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Table 4.6: Modified Easterlin Paradox
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reported Corrected Reported Corrected Reported Corrected Reported Corrected
Panel a
rich10=0 × lgdp10 -0.165*** -0.031
(0.047) (0.034)
rich10=1 × lgdp10 0.220*** 0.099***
(0.046) (0.033)
rich15=0 × lgdp15 -0.126*** -0.027
(0.038) (0.027)
rich15=1 × lgdp15 0.319*** 0.149***
(0.060) (0.043)
rich20=0 × lgdp20 -0.086** -0.014
(0.035) (0.025)
rich20=1 × lgdp20 0.391*** 0.186***
(0.083) (0.058)
Panel b
< lgdp10 -0.149*** -0.011
(0.051) (0.036)
> lgdp10, < lgdp20 0.117 -0.024
(0.126) (0.090)
> lgdp20 0.297*** 0.191***
(0.099) (0.070)
Constant 1.930*** 1.878*** 1.934*** 1.879*** 1.960*** 1.892*** 2.296*** 1.931***
(0.042) (0.030) (0.041) (0.030) (0.044) (0.031) (0.090) (0.064)
adj.R-squared 0.229 0.086 0.258 0.121 0.207 0.112 0.226 0.101
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
rich10=1 indicates countries with GDP over $10,000 per capita, similar definition for other thresholds.
lgdp15 is the corresponding log difference over this threshold as in Equation 4.16. The similar notations applies for lgdp10 and lgdp20.
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in the magnitude of the correlation between the log of GDP per capita and SWB after applying
the SWB correction in all specifications, it is clear that this association is robust even beyond the
threshold of $20,000. Taken together, neither the original nor the modified-Easterlin hypothesis is
supported by the cross-country analysis of corrected SWB. This means that corrected measures of
SWB are correlated with GDP per capita; However, reported SWB is not. This implies that SWB
measures can be used to evaluate economic development and welfare, but they have to be corrected
for measurement errors.
4.5 Conclusion
Evaluations of economic development and social welfare normally use objective outcome indi-
cators; however, subjective measurements of welfare also provide insights. Subjective well-being
data have usually been obtained by self-reported surveys. However, due to its inherent nature,
reported SWB is subject to substantial misclassification errors.
In this article we apply a new method to uncover the latent true distribution of subjective well-
being using data from the integrated EVS/WVS surveys. We find that reported happiness in surveys
has substantial misclassification errors. This is of particular importance to the literature since
most studies rely on reported SWB to address economic questions of interest. We explore the
characteristics of countries and demographic groups with substantial misclassification errors and
find that religious beliefs and the development stage of the countries play a critical role in the
magnitude of misclassification errors in reported SWB. We revisit the Easterlin paradox and find
that based on a country level analysis there is no evidence supporting neither the original hypothesis
nor the modified version of the Easterlin’s paradox when using the corrected measure of happiness,
although the reported (uncorrected) SWB provides support to the original Easterlin paradox.
The identified misclassification errors in reported subjective well-being provide directions for
the future research. First, further efforts can be devoted to conduct causal analysis of the relation-
ship between misclassification errors and their influencing factors. A richer longitudinal dataset
or exogenous variations can help to establish causality. In addition, follow-up surveys may enable
researchers to explore individual characteristics driving misclassification errors in SWB reports.
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Finally, experimental studies can be useful to examine how psychological and behavioral elements
such as envy and self-deception affect misclassification errors of SWB measures in survey data.
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4.6 Supplement
4.6.1 Data Summary Statistics
Data analyzed for this study is from the Integrated European Survey (EVS) and World Value
Survey (WVS) from 1981 to 2014. During these years, EVS was conducted for four waves: 1981-
1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001 and 2008-2010, while WVS was conducted for six waves: 1981-
1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014.
Figure 4.5 provides a list of the countries with respect to their corresponding survey waves.
Some countries were not continuously surveyed across the waves. For the same wave, WVS and
EVS may or may not cover exactly the same years (e.g., “WVS: 1989-1993” vs. “EVS: 1990-
1993”, “WVS: 1999-2004” vs. “EVS: 1999-2001”). Due to this very unbalanced feature of the data
structure, we pool all the waves together for each country and conduct a cross sectional analysis.
Table 4.7 shows the summary statistics for the reported values of the three measurements of
subjective well-being (SWB). In each demographic cell, it reports the sample mean for the per-
centage of people reporting each level of a given SWB measure. The tabulation is implemented
with all 80 countries sample pooled together.
In Table 4.8, we present the estimated misclassification error in each country. It summarizes
by major religion, geographical location, development stage, reported/corrected SWB along with
the misclassification errors (by level and vector distance).
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Figure 4.5: Survey Waves for the 80 Countries in the Sample
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Table 4.7: Summary Statistics (%)
Panel A: Happiness
Not Happy Quite Happy Very Happy
Income Level: Low 27.64 49.93 22.43
Income Level: Middle 16.50 55.62 27.88
Income Level: High 10.19 53.13 36.68
15-29 years 15.79 53.32 30.90
30-49 years 18.42 54.71 26.87
50 and more years 22.21 53.76 24.03
Male 18.80 54.81 26.40
Female 18.94 53.53 27.53
Panel B: Life Satisfaction (LS)
Most Dissatisfied Quite Satisfied Most Satisfied
Income Level: Low 27.87 52.89 19.23
Income Level: Middle 14.87 62.82 22.31
Income Level: High 9.38 58.39 32.23
15-29 years 15.80 59.66 24.54
30-49 years 18.22 59.51 22.27
50 and more years 18.80 56.75 24.45
Male 17.93 59.27 22.80
Female 17.66 58.18 24.16
Panel C: Freedom of Choice and Control in Life (FCC)
Not At All Quite A Bit A Great Deal
Income Level: Low 23.06 52.93 24.02
Income Level: Middle 13.55 62.39 24.05
Income Level: High 9.83 59.36 30.81
15-29 years 14.21 59.27 26.52
30-49 years 15.70 59.88 24.42
50 and more years 17.62 57.77 24.61
Male 15.09 58.67 26.24
Female 16.72 59.38 23.90
Notes: sample means in percentage for 80 countries in the sample
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Table 4.8: Misclassification Error at Country Level
Country Religion Area Development Reported Corrected
Misclassification Error
Euclidean Rectilinear Level 1 Level 3
Algeria Islam GME Upper middle 1.994 1.865 0.158 0.632 -0.223 -0.094
Andorra Christianity Europe High 2.206 1.633 0.419 0.985 -0.493 0.081
Armenia Christianity Europe Lower middle 1.894 1.943 0.035 0.301 -0.051 -0.099
Australia Christianity Oceania High 2.296 2.083 0.026 0.261 -0.131 0.083
Austria Christianity Europe High 2.216 2.141 0.034 0.290 -0.110 -0.035
Azerbaijan Islam Europe Upper middle 2.003 1.804 0.059 0.361 -0.180 0.019
Bahrain Islam GME High 1.945 2.025 0.040 0.314 -0.039 -0.118
Bangladesh Islam Asia Lower middle 1.990 1.727 0.146 0.544 -0.268 -0.005
Belarus Mixed Europe Upper middle 1.696 1.832 0.014 0.194 0.040 -0.097
Brazil Christianity Americas Upper middle 2.180 2.101 0.073 0.433 -0.148 -0.069
Bulgaria Christianity Europe Upper middle 1.566 1.732 0.029 0.267 0.033 -0.134
Canada Christianity Americas High 2.301 2.083 0.100 0.450 -0.221 -0.004
Chile Christianity Americas High 2.093 1.906 0.058 0.352 -0.176 0.011
P.R.China Confucian Asia Upper middle 1.985 1.977 0.012 0.181 -0.049 -0.041
Colombia Christianity Americas Upper middle 2.404 2.434 0.000 0.033 0.017 -0.013
Croatia Christianity Europe High 1.855 1.829 0.066 0.418 -0.118 -0.091
Cyprus Christianity Europe High 2.158 1.835 0.054 0.362 -0.142 0.181
Denmark Christianity Europe High 2.362 2.076 0.075 0.436 -0.218 0.068
Continued on next page
73
Table 4.8 Continued
Country Religion Area Development Reported Corrected
Misclassification Error
Euclidean Rectilinear Level 1 Level 3
Dominican Rep. Christianity Americas Upper middle 2.071 2.036 0.031 0.285 0.054 0.089
Ecuador Christianity Americas Upper middle 2.512 1.751 0.345 0.954 -0.477 0.284
Egypt Islam GME Lower middle 1.732 1.932 0.024 0.250 0.125 -0.075
El Salvador Christianity Americas Lower middle 2.484 2.008 0.133 0.592 -0.296 0.180
France Christianity Europe High 2.193 1.920 0.074 0.430 -0.215 0.058
Georgia Christianity Europe Upper middle 1.823 1.957 0.032 0.258 0.005 -0.129
Germany Christianity Europe High 2.029 1.909 0.157 0.631 -0.218 -0.097
Ghana Christianity SSA Lower middle 2.303 2.136 0.055 0.331 -0.001 0.166
Great Britain Christianity Europe High 2.444 2.117 0.105 0.512 -0.256 0.070
Greece Christianity Europe High 1.955 1.999 0.009 0.146 0.058 0.015
Guatemala Christianity Americas Lower middle 2.209 1.949 0.047 0.353 -0.176 0.083
Hong Kong(China) Confucian Asia High 2.031 1.635 0.393 0.916 -0.427 -0.031
Hungary Christianity Europe High 1.870 1.699 0.175 0.655 -0.249 -0.078
Iceland Christianity Europe High 2.426 2.169 0.165 0.593 -0.277 -0.020
India Hinduism Asia Lower middle 2.086 1.839 0.033 0.288 -0.144 0.102
Indonesia Islam Asia Lower middle 2.166 1.990 0.199 0.699 -0.263 -0.086
Iran Islam GME Upper middle 1.939 1.742 0.082 0.410 -0.201 -0.004
Iraq Islam GME Upper middle 1.723 1.700 0.023 0.246 -0.073 -0.050
Italy Christianity Europe High 1.990 1.876 0.099 0.497 -0.181 -0.067
Continued on next page
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Table 4.8 Continued
Country Religion Area Development Reported Corrected
Misclassification Error
Euclidean Rectilinear Level 1 Level 3
Japan Confucian Asia High 2.147 1.767 0.134 0.583 -0.291 0.088
Kazakhstan Islam Asia Upper middle 2.190 2.244 0.159 0.647 -0.135 -0.188
Kyrgyzstan Islam Asia Lower middle 2.188 1.957 0.177 0.633 -0.274 -0.043
Latvia Christianity Europe High 1.666 1.912 0.136 0.531 -0.010 -0.255
Lebanon Islam GME Upper middle 1.966 1.852 0.013 0.181 -0.091 0.023
Lithuania Christianity Europe High 1.650 1.832 0.022 0.240 0.062 -0.120
Luxembourg Christianity Europe High 2.310 2.099 0.054 0.357 -0.179 0.032
Macedonia Christianity Europe Upper middle 1.873 1.938 0.007 0.121 0.005 -0.061
Malaysia Islam Asia Upper middle 2.422 2.127 0.173 0.588 -0.294 0.001
Mali Islam SSA Low 2.250 1.948 0.065 0.416 -0.094 0.208
Mexico Christianity Americas Upper middle 2.342 1.925 0.090 0.460 -0.230 0.187
Moldova Christianity Europe Lower middle 1.578 1.588 0.002 0.074 -0.014 -0.024
Montenegro Christianity Europe Upper middle 1.869 1.916 0.023 0.244 -0.037 -0.085
Morocco Islam GME Lower middle 2.028 1.845 0.021 0.236 -0.118 0.065
Netherlands Christianity Europe High 2.335 1.943 0.093 0.496 -0.248 0.144
New Zealand Christianity Oceania High 2.314 2.103 0.050 0.347 -0.174 0.037
Nigeria Mixed SSA Lower middle 2.369 1.906 0.125 0.572 -0.177 0.286
Norway Christianity Europe High 2.268 2.114 0.064 0.374 -0.170 -0.017
Pakistan Islam Asia Lower middle 2.183 2.055 0.024 0.229 -0.014 0.115
Continued on next page
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Table 4.8 Continued
Country Religion Area Development Reported Corrected
Misclassification Error
Euclidean Rectilinear Level 1 Level 3
Philippines Christianity Asia Lower middle 2.331 2.129 0.023 0.246 -0.123 0.080
Poland Christianity Europe High 1.993 1.824 0.104 0.490 -0.207 -0.038
Portugal Christianity Europe High 1.854 1.726 0.038 0.283 -0.135 -0.006
Puerto Rico Christianity Americas High 2.444 2.083 0.072 0.430 -0.215 0.146
Qatar Islam GME High 2.535 2.239 0.052 0.370 -0.112 0.185
Russia Christianity Europe Upper middle 1.676 1.701 0.001 0.054 -0.001 -0.026
Rwanda Christianity SSA Low 2.161 1.836 0.075 0.446 -0.223 0.102
Serbia Christianity Europe Upper middle 1.876 1.738 0.086 0.451 -0.182 -0.044
Singapore Confucian Asia High 2.289 1.944 0.082 0.469 -0.110 0.234
Slovakia Christianity Europe High 1.706 1.920 0.052 0.352 0.038 -0.176
Slovenia Christianity Europe High 1.893 1.785 0.009 0.156 -0.078 0.030
South Africa Christianity SSA Upper middle 2.113 2.038 0.003 0.094 -0.028 0.047
Spain Christianity Europe High 2.048 1.778 0.143 0.536 -0.268 0.001
Sweden Christianity Europe High 2.333 2.146 0.033 0.287 -0.144 0.043
Switzerland Christianity Europe High 2.334 2.273 0.011 0.159 0.010 0.070
Taiwan Confucian Asia High 2.151 1.836 0.152 0.576 -0.288 0.027
Tanzania Islam SSA Low 2.496 1.915 0.173 0.632 -0.266 0.316
Trinidad&Tobago Mixed Americas High 2.399 2.099 0.070 0.430 -0.085 0.215
Tunisia Islam GME Lower middle 1.972 1.868 0.013 0.176 -0.088 0.016
Continued on next page
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Table 4.8 Continued
Country Religion Area Development Reported Corrected
Misclassification Error
Euclidean Rectilinear Level 1 Level 3
Turkey Islam GME Upper middle 2.145 1.909 0.145 0.559 0.022 0.258
Ukraine Christianity Europe Lower middle 1.795 1.675 0.052 0.347 -0.147 -0.026
United States Christianity Americas High 2.304 2.038 0.126 0.512 -0.256 0.010
Venezuela Christianity Americas Upper middle 2.462 1.937 0.149 0.613 -0.219 0.306
Zimbabwe Christianity SSA Low 2.000 2.088 0.005 0.112 0.032 -0.056
Notes: SSA, Sub-Saharan Africa. GME, Greater Middle East
Categorization of Development Stage is obtained from World Bank.
Major Religion and Area are from World Factbook.
Data Source: Identified results from section 4.3.
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4.6.2 Proof of the Identification Procedure
In this section, we provide the formal proof that following Theorem 1 in Hu (2008), Assump-
tions 1 through 5 guarantee the nonparametric identification and estimation for the misclassifica-
tion matrix HX|X∗,c through eigen-decomposition.
Proof. By the law of total probability and Assumptions 1 - 2, we have
Pr(Y,X,Z|c) =
∑
X∗
Pr(Y,X,Z|X∗, c)Pr(X∗|c)
=
∑
X∗
Pr(Y |X,Z,X∗, c)Pr(X|Z,X∗, c)Pr(Z|X∗, c)Pr(X∗|c)
=
∑
X∗
Pr(Y |X∗, c)Pr(X|X∗, c)Pr(X∗, Z|c)
(4.16)
and
Pr(X,Z|c) =
∑
X∗
Pr(X,Z|X∗, c)Pr(X∗|c) =
∑
X∗
Pr(X|X∗, Z, c)Pr(Z|X∗, c)Pr(X∗|c)
=
∑
X∗
Pr(X|X∗, c)Pr(X∗, Z|c)
(4.17)
Defining in matrix, we have
HX|X∗,c ≡ [Pr(X = i|X∗ = k, c)]i,k
=

Pr(X = 1|X∗ = 1, c) Pr(X = 1|X∗ = 2, c) Pr(X = 1|X∗ = 3, c)
Pr(X = 2|X∗ = 1, c) Pr(X = 2|X∗ = 2, c) Pr(X = 2|X∗ = 3, c)
Pr(X = 3|X∗ = 1, c) Pr(X = 3|X∗ = 2, c) Pr(X = 3|X∗ = 3, c)
 (4.18)
HX∗,Z|c ≡ [Pr(X∗ = i, Z = k|c)]i,k
=

Pr(X∗ = 1, Z = 1|c) Pr(X∗ = 1, Z = 2|c) Pr(X∗ = 1, Z = 3|c)
Pr(X∗ = 2, Z = 1|c) Pr(X∗ = 2, Z = 2|c) Pr(X∗ = 2, Z = 3|c)
Pr(X∗ = 3, Z = 1|c) Pr(X∗ = 3, Z = 2|c) Pr(X∗ = 3, Z = 3|c)
 (4.19)
78
HX,Z|c ≡ [Pr(X = i, Z = k|c)]i,k
=

Pr(X = 1, Z = 1|c) Pr(X = 1, Z = 2|c) Pr(X = 1, Z = 3|c)
Pr(X = 2, Z = 1|c) Pr(X = 2, Z = 2|c) Pr(X = 2, Z = 3|c)
Pr(X = 3, Z = 1|c) Pr(X = 3, Z = 2|c) Pr(X = 3, Z = 3|c)
 (4.20)
HY |Z,c ≡ [Pr(Y = i|Z = k, c)]i,k
=

Pr(Y = 1|Z = 1, c) Pr(Y = 1|Z = 2, c) Pr(Y = 1|Z = 3, c)
Pr(Y = 2|Z = 1, c) Pr(Y = 2|Z = 2, c) Pr(Y = 2|Z = 3, c)
Pr(Y = 3|Z = 1, c) Pr(Y = 3|Z = 2, c) Pr(Y = 3|Z = 3, c)
 (4.21)
HY=3,X,Z|c ≡ [Pr(Y = 3, X = i, Z = k|c)]i,k
=

Pr(Y = 3, X = 1, Z = 1|c) Pr(Y = 3, X = 1, Z = 2, c) Pr(Y = 3, X = 1, Z = 3|c)
Pr(Y = 3, X = 2, Z = 1|c) Pr(Y = 3, X = 2, Z = 2, c) Pr(Y = 3, X = 2, Z = 3|c)
Pr(Y = 3, X = 3, Z = 1|c) Pr(Y = 3, X = 3, Z = 2, c) Pr(Y = 3, X = 3, Z = 3|c)

(4.22)
The diagonal matrix is defined as HY=3|X∗,c ≡ [Pr(Y = 3|X∗ = k, c)]k
=

Pr(Y = 3|X∗ = 1, c) 0 0
0 Pr(Y = 3|X∗ = 2, c) 0
0 0 Pr(Y = 3|X∗ = 3, c)
 (4.23)
Expressing the relationship in Equations 4.16 and 4.17 with matrix definition, we have
HY=3,X,Z|c =HX|X∗,cHY=3|X∗,cHX∗,Z|c (4.24)
and
HX,Z|c = HX|X∗,cHX∗,Z|c (4.25)
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Given Assumption 3, HX,Z|c is invertible. Post-multiplying both sides of Equation 4.24 byH−1X,Z|c
yields the following identification equation:
HY=3,X,Z|cHX,Z|c−1 = HX|X∗,cHY=3|X∗,cHX∗,Z|cHX∗,Z|c−1HX|X∗,c−1
= HX|X∗,cHY=3|X∗,cHX|X∗,c−1
(4.26)
Consequently,
HX|X∗,c = ζ(HY=3,X,Z|cHX,Z|c−1) (4.27)
where ζ(·) denotes the mapping from a square matrix to its eigenvector matrix. The three eigenval-
ues are the three elements of the diagonal matrixHY=3|X∗,c. Note that in our case each eigenvector
is a distribution, the summation of the elements is equal to 1, which indicates that the ζ(·) is nor-
malized. The monotonically ordered eigenvalues in X∗, implied in Assumption 4 and 5, guarantee
a unique mapping of ζ(·). Hence,HY=3,X,Z|cHX,Z|c−1 is obtained by direct calculation. Following
Hu (2008), HX|X∗,c can be uniquely identified.
Pre-multiplying the observed probability distribution of reported SWB by the inverse ofHX|X∗,c
yields [Pr(X∗ = k|c)]k = HX|X∗,c−1 [Pr(X = k|c)]k, which is the true latent status of SWB.
=

Pr(X = 1|X∗ = 1, c) · · · Pr(X = 1|X∗ = 3, c)
Pr(X = 2|X∗ = 1, c) · · · Pr(X = 2|X∗ = 3, c)
Pr(X = 3|X∗ = 1, c) · · · Pr(X = 3|X∗ = 3, c)

−1
Pr(X = 1|c)
Pr(X = 2|c)
Pr(X = 3|c)

=

Pr(X∗ = 1|c)
Pr(X∗ = 2|c)
Pr(X∗ = 3|c)

(4.28)
QED.
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4.6.3 Evaluation of Assumptions 3 and 4
Assumption 3 requires matrix HX,Z|c to satisfy the full rank condition. We rigorously test this
in a sequential manner following the procedure proposed by Robin and Smith (2000). Specifi-
cally, we first test the null hypothesis of Rank(HX,Z|c) = 0 against the alternative hypothesis
of Rank(HX,Z|c) > 0. If the null is rejected at 5% significant level, we then test the null of
Rank(HX,Z|c) = 1 against the alternative of Rank(HX,Z|c) > 1. If the null is again rejected at
5% level, we then test the null of Rank(HX,Z|c) = 2 against the alternative of Rank(HX,Z|c) > 2.
As we have three levels in each measurement of SWB, the dimension of matrix HX,Z|c is ac-
cordingly 3 × 3. If the null is still rejected at 5% significant level, then the full rank condition is
satisfied.
By the full factorials of two gender, three age and three income categories, we divide the data
of each country into 18 sub-samples. We apply the rank test for each of the 18 demographic groups
across all the 80 countries with 1000 bootstrapping replications. Across the 1440 (80 × 18) tests
implemented, the null hypotheses ofRank(HX,Z|c) = 0 andRank(HX,Z|c) = 1 are rejected at 1%
significant level. Due to the limitations of sample size, the null hypothesis of Rank(HX,Z|c) = 2
can not be rejected at 5% significant level for some demographic groups in some countries. In
Assumption 4, we require the diagonal matrix HY=3|X∗,c to have three distinct elements, demo-
graphic groups not satisfying this condition are also not identified. Collectively, 107 out of 1440
demographic groups are not identifiable and removed from the data set. Two-sided Binomial tests
for the hypothesis that each identified group is chosen with equal probability (1/18) can not be
rejected for all 18 demographic groups at 10% significant level (Table 4.9). Therefore, the propor-
tion of each identified group observed after the sample attrition is not significantly different from
random (with probability of 1/18).
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Table 4.9: Results of Binomial Test for Each of the 18 Demographic Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup Subgroup
P-value 0.605 0.605 0.527 0.774 0.455 0.455 0.527 0.774 0.527 0.605 0.605 0.185 0.687 0.863 0.388 0.527 0.774 0.120
Observed 75 75 74 77 73 73 74 77 74 75 75 68 76 78 72 74 77 66
Notes: N = 1,440. The null hypothesis is that the probability of observing each identified demographic group is equal to 1/18
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4.6.4 Misclassification Errors for Five Representative Countries: By Demographic Groups
Table 4.10 to 4.12 present the misclassification errors aggregated at different demographic
groups (income, gender and age) for five representative countries, including China, Germany, Iraq,
Mali, and the United States.
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Table 4.10: Misclassification Errors, By Income Group (five representative countries)
Country
Level 1 (Unhappy) Level 3 (Very Happy)
reported corrected difference reported corrected difference
Panel A: Low Income
China(Mainland) 0.126 0.295 -0.170 0.205 0.311 -0.106
(0.013) (0.100) (0.019) (0.071)
Germany 0.098 0.387 -0.289 0.192 0.268 -0.076
(0.009) (0.101) (0.011) (0.084)
Iraq 0.113 0.214 -0.101 0.292 0.274 0.018
(0.014) (0.101) (0.030) (0.090)
Mali 0.073 0.099 -0.026 0.623 0.353 0.269
(0.020) (0.106) (0.037) (0.108)
United States 0.036 0.201 -0.165 0.445 0.521 -0.076
(0.005) (0.118) (0.013) (0.080)
Panel B: Middle Income
China(Mainland) 0.301 0.330 -0.029 0.190 0.301 -0.110
(0.010) (0.108) (0.008) (0.071)
Germany 0.231 0.392 -0.161 0.142 0.227 -0.085
(0.009) (0.089) (0.008) (0.047)
Iraq 0.490 0.369 0.122 0.074 0.155 -0.082
(0.012) (0.091) (0.006) (0.054)
Mali 0.348 0.201 0.146 0.266 0.231 0.035
(0.031) (0.105) (0.029) (0.104)
United States 0.140 0.464 -0.324 0.307 0.324 -0.017
(0.009) (0.096) (0.012) (0.055)
Panel C: High Income
China(Mainland) 0.165 0.208 -0.043 0.197 0.182 0.015
(0.006) (0.103) (0.007) (0.047)
Germany 0.127 0.356 -0.229 0.199 0.308 -0.109
(0.006) (0.085) (0.006) (0.034)
Iraq 0.357 0.511 -0.154 0.093 0.136 -0.044
(0.009) (0.095) (0.005) (0.051)
Mali 0.116 0.318 -0.202 0.419 0.160 0.259
(0.013) (0.104) (0.021) (0.089)
United States 0.067 0.326 -0.259 0.390 0.343 0.047
(0.004) (0.092) (0.007) (0.053)
Notes: Numbers reported in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors based on 300 repetitions.
Source: Identified results from section 2.3.
84
Table 4.11: Misclassification Errors, By Gender Group (five representative countries)
Country
Level 1 (Unhappy) Level 3 (Very Happy)
reported corrected difference reported corrected difference
Panel A: Female
China(Mainland) 0.190 0.249 -0.059 0.205 0.212 -0.008
(0.007) (0.111) (0.007) (0.056)
Germany 0.164 0.300 -0.137 0.189 0.288 -0.099
(0.006) (0.071) (0.006) (0.032)
Iraq 0.341 0.318 0.023 0.107 0.102 0.006
(0.009) (0.089) (0.006) (0.045)
Mali 0.149 0.258 -0.109 0.408 0.120 0.288
(0.015) (0.100) (0.022) (0.078)
United States 0.075 0.402 -0.327 0.390 0.345 0.045
(0.004) (0.082) (0.008) (0.059)
Panel B: Male
China(Mainland) 0.228 0.269 -0.041 0.188 0.258 -0.070
(0.007) (0.087) (0.007) (0.048)
Germany 0.140 0.451 -0.311 0.173 0.269 -0.096
(0.006) (0.091) (0.006) (0.043)
Iraq 0.413 0.580 -0.166 0.094 0.199 -0.105
(0.010) (0.100) (0.006) (0.059)
Mali 0.178 0.257 -0.079 0.420 0.291 0.129
(0.017) (0.099) (0.022) (0.096)
United States 0.080 0.266 -0.186 0.373 0.397 -0.024
(0.005) (0.095) (0.008) (0.044)
Notes: Numbers reported in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors based on 300 repetitions.
Source: Identified results from section 2.3.
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Table 4.12: Misclassification Errors, By Age Group (five representative countries)
Country
Level 1 (Unhappy) Level 3 (Very Happy)
reported corrected difference reported corrected difference
Panel A: Age Band 15-29 Years
China(Mainland) 0.210 0.354 -0.144 0.193 0.283 -0.090
(0.011) (0.092) (0.011) (0.082)
Germany 0.105 0.428 -0.323 0.198 0.259 -0.061
(0.008) (0.081) (0.010) (0.042)
Iraq 0.339 0.402 -0.062 0.128 0.126 0.003
(0.011) (0.083) (0.008) (0.042)
Mali 0.119 0.424 -0.305 0.456 0.196 0.260
(0.016) (0.118) (0.025) (0.090)
United States 0.076 0.086 -0.010 0.371 0.330 0.041
(0.007) (0.114) (0.012) (0.073)
Panel B: Age Band 30-49 Years
China(Mainland) 0.205 0.110 0.095 0.202 0.225 -0.023
(0.007) (0.118) (0.007) (0.052)
Germany 0.137 0.269 -0.133 0.195 0.316 -0.121
(0.007) (0.101) (0.008) (0.042)
Iraq 0.388 0.481 -0.093 0.088 0.097 -0.009
(0.010) (0.119) (0.006) (0.047)
Mali 0.169 0.119 0.049 0.398 0.229 0.170
(0.017) (0.114) (0.024) (0.114)
United States 0.077 0.519 -0.442 0.380 0.373 0.007
(0.005) (0.117) (0.009) (0.053)
Panel C: Age Band 50 and More Years
China(Mainland) 0.221 0.462 -0.241 0.186 0.212 -0.027
(0.009) (0.117) (0.009) (0.061)
Germany 0.190 0.437 -0.247 0.162 0.255 -0.093
(0.008) (0.092) (0.007) (0.046)
Iraq 0.428 0.469 -0.041 0.079 0.340 -0.261
(0.016) (0.127) (0.009) (0.145)
Mali 0.233 0.251 -0.018 0.374 0.177 0.197
(0.030) (0.132) (0.034) (0.090)
United States 0.079 0.288 -0.209 0.390 0.393 -0.003
(0.005) (0.090) (0.009) (0.067)
Notes: Numbers reported in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors based on 300 repetitions.
Source: Identified results from section 2.3.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Public policy is essential to society. Good policy initiatives help society to operate more effec-
tively without necessarily sacrificing equity. Quantitatively evaluating the efficiency and impact
of public policies determines whether the policy making outcomes result as planned. While the
intended effect is well-anticipated, the unintended effects are generally difficult to foresee. Both
impacts are of public-interest and they are key for social welfare.
This dissertation covers three slightly different angles to study public policy. In the first es-
say, we identify potential unintended effects leading to an increase in the occurrence of violent
crime rates following the initial passage of Alabama’s anti-illegal immigrant bill—HB56. One
explaining mechanism is provided in the seminal work of Gary Becker (Becker, 1968). HB56’s
strict restriction for undocumented immigrants taking job positions decreased the opportunity cost
of criminal behavior. Another possible mechanism is associated to the growing literature on ex-
pressive value of law, which suggests the act of enacting a particular law serves the function of
shaping norms or prescribed attitude towards behavior (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017). The adoption
of an anti-immigration law will send out a signal of increased tolerance to discrimination behav-
ior against undocumented workers, which can also potentially generate tensions or conflicts that
may result in violent crimes against undocumented immigrants. Whether the increase in violent
crimes is committed by undocumented immigrants or against them, and through which underlying
mechanism merit further investigation using richer data.
In the second essay, we examine the impact of an immigration law—AC 21 on high-skilled
labor markets. The unexpected exemption of the H-1B visa cap for working in eligible academic
institutions or research entities changed the risk of being denied entrance to the US labor market
for foreign-born Ph.D. graduates. The finding suggests that AC 21 significantly boosted the pref-
erence for working in academia by 5% among US-trained foreign doctorate recipients. AC 21 also
indirectly caused foreign Ph.D. graduates to be 3-4% less likely to begin a career in industry. These
results further pass a series of variation in specifications and placebo and falsification tests. The po-
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tential implication of these findings is profound. Well-educated foreign professionals are playing
leading roles in innovation and technology development in the United States. Being able to retain
the human capital actively contributing to fundamental research can significantly benefit United
States in the long-term. The results of this study indicate that this goal can be effectively achieved
by simply reducing the barriers in the visa application process for high-skilled professionals.
When policy makers design intervention programs, their goals are usually measured by ob-
jectively measurable outcomes, such as food access and expenditures, changes in prices, income,
health care access, etc. While objective measures serve the purpose of evaluating the efficacy of
public policies, subjective well-being provides insights on whether a policy benefits the general
public in a broader sense. Indeed, recent studies attempt to use subjective welfare to study poverty
(Blank, 2008), health and the environment (Zhang et al., 2015), and social progress (Fehder et al.,
2018). However, the inherent measurement error in reported SWB restricts it from being applied
for public policy research.
In the third essay, we use a newly developed method to recover the latent true distribution
of subjective well-being for 80 countries. The results show that SWB, collected in surveys, has
substantial misclassification errors. Religious beliefs and the development stage of a country play
critical roles in determining the magnitude of misclassification errors. Reexamining the Easterlin
paradox and modified-Easterlin hypothesis implies that although reported SWB is not associated
with GDP per capita, corrected measure of SWB is; and this relationship is robust beyond an
income satiation point. To apply SWB for program evaluation study, future research still need
to identify the influencing factors which causally impact the misclassification errors in reported
SWB. A richer longitudinal dataset and exogenous variation would be ideal ways to move in this
direction.
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